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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Administrative Law-Agency Rulemaking Must Conform Strictly With
Requirements of Administrative Procedure Act.-Members of nine low
income households, along with the City of New York, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and the National Welfare Rights Organization, brought an
action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA) charging it with a failure to make funda-
mental changes in the food stamp allotment system' in order to comply with
the 1971 amendments to the Food Stamp Act.2 Originally, the purpose of the
allotment system was to provide food stamp recipients "with an opportunity
more nearly to obtain a nutritionally adequate diet .... ,,3 As a result of the
1971 amendments, the Act now requires that recipients be given "an op-
portunity to obtain a nutritionally adequate diet. . . . ,14 USDA revamped the
food stamp program in order to comply with the new requirements. 5 The fact
that the allotment system was left unchanged, 6 however, indicates that USDA
found the existing system sufficient to meet the more stringent requirements.
Plaintiffs' challenge to the allotment system concerned two crucial features:
the Economy Food Plan and the hypothetical family of four.7 It was alleged
1. The food stamp program was established by the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-25(1970). It is under the auspices of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). In
1969, a new Food and Nutrition Service was established within USDA to direct the food stamp
program and other similar services. 34 Fed. Reg. 13,119 (1969); see Frey, The Spiraling Food Stamp
Program, 3 Texas Tech. L. Rev. 285 (1972).
The allotment system is a schedule which determines both the face value of the stamps a
recipient may receive each month, and the price he will have to pay to receive them. For
example, under the most recent allotment schedule, a family of four is allotted a monthly supply
of stamps with a face value of $162. Depending on the monthly income of that family, this
allotment will cost anywhere from zero to $138. 40 Fed. Reg. 19,856 (1975).
2. Extensive changes were made in all phases of the Food Stamp Act in 1971. Act of Jan. 1I,
1971, Pub. L. No. 91-671, 84 Stat. 2048, amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-25 (1964) (codified at 7
U.S.C. §§ 2011-25 (Supp. I1, 1973)). For an anlysis of the bill which contained these amendments
see 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6025 (1970).
3. 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a) (1964), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a) (1970).
4. 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a) (Supp. III, 1973). Rodway v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 514
F.2d 809, 811-12 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
5. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 270.1-274.14 (1975).
6. There was only a brief mention of the allotment system in the new regulations. Id. § 271.5
(1975). The allotments themselves are adjusted semi-annually as required by 7 U.S.C. § 2016(a)
(1970), as amended, (Supp. HI, 1973), in order to account for changes in the cost of food. In
comparing the first allotment schedule published after the 1971 amendments, 36 Fed. Reg. 7273
(1971), with the earlier schedule, as was done in Parker, King & Maloney, Polyunsaturated
Placebos for the Poor Food Stamps, the Food Industry and Government Regulation, 17 How.
L.J. 489, 521 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Parker], it is clear that no systematic changes were
made. This was admitted by USDA in 36 Fed. Reg. 20,148 (1971), cited in Rodway, 514 F.2d at
815 n.8.
7. The Economy Food Plan is one of five food plans formulated by USDA, each of which
provides a nutritionally adequate diet. See Parker, supra note 6, at 526-28. As the least expensive of
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that the Economy Food Plan did not provide a nutritionally adequate diet.
Furthermore, it was charged that the hypothetical family of four averaging
system failed to provide all food stamp recipients with the opportunity to
purchase even the Economy Food Plan. The averaging did not take into
consideration variables which affected the needs of individual families and
did not adjust quickly enough to the changes in food prices.8
In the district court, plaintiffs' request for partial summary judgment was
denied, and USDA's request for summary judgment on the merits of the case
was granted. 9 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit remanded because of violations of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 10 The court also chose to discuss the merits of the case and gave orders
to USDA amounting to a reversal of the district court on the merits."
Rodway v. United States Department of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
The procedural issue concerning administrative law was not before the
district court, but was raised for the first time by the court of appeals in its
review of the case. 12 The issue involved the procedure set forth by the APA
for conducting "informal rulemaking." 13 Specifically, the APA requires an
the five plans, the Economy Food Plan provides a barely adequate diet through the use of low cost
foods, with a minimum of variety and palatability. The hypothetical family of four is an attempt to
establish an average family in terms of ages and sex, two important factors in determining nutrition
requirements. 514 F.2d at 812 n. 1. The costof the Economy Food Plan for this hypothetical familyof
four was used as the basis to establish the allotment schedule for families of any size. Id. at 812.
8. 514 F.2d at 812.
9. Rodway v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 369 F. Supp. 1094 (D.D.C. 1973). The case
had previously been remanded by the court of appeals. Rodway v. United States Dep't of
Agriculture, 482 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1973). On that appeal, the court of appeals reversed an
earlier decision of the district court which had dismissed the case as moot. A price rollback by
USDA had mooted plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, but the court of appeals held
that it did not moot the basic controversy concerning the allotment system. Id. at 725-26.
10. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-76 (1970). USDA was required to commence a new rulemaking
procedure to be completed within 120 days. In the meantime, the allotment regulations already
published were to remain in effect- 514 F.2d at 817-18.
11. 514 F.2d at 824. In his concurring opinion, Judge Wilkey referred to this part of the
opinion as dicta. See notes 64-65 infra and accompanying text.
12. 514 F.2dat813.
13. Rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970), is one of three procedures employed by agencies in
formulating policy. There are two statutory methods of rulemaking which are usually referred to
as formal and informal. Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rulnemaking: Some Recent
Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 Duke L.J. 51, 51-52 [hereinafter cited as
Clagett]; Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 Va. L. Rev. 185, 186-87 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Verkuil]. Formal rulemaking involves a public hearing, S U.S.C. § 553(c)
(1970), with detailed procedural rules. Id. §§ 556-57 (1970). For a discussion of the procedure for
informal rulemaking see notes 14-15 infra and accompanying text. The other two procedures used
by agencies are adjudication, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-67 (1970), which is an actual trial, settling a
dispute between adverse litigants, and informal action, which is agency decision-making without
public participation. The latter term is used in Clagett, supra at 52 n.3 and K. Davis,
Administrative Law §§ 4.01-.12 (3d ed. 1972).
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agency engaging in "informal rulemaking"'14 to provide notice of proposed
rules in the Federal Register, to solicit comments from interested parties and,
upon publication of the rule, to provide a concise statement of its basis and
purpose.' 5 The court found that USDA neglected to satisfy any of these
requirements in formulating its allotment system.'
6
The court reached this conclusion without discussing, in depth, the scope of
its power to review USDA rules, which is often a controversial issue. 
7 It
seemed to follow the modern trend of rejecting the two separate tests listed in
the APA' 8 and of determining merely whether the rules were the product of
"reasoned decision-making."1 9 This is why the court refused to determine
The question of which procedure to apply in a particular situation is a controversial issue.
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483
F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.
1973); FitzGerald, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission and the Flexibility of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 26 Ad. L. Rev. 287 (1974).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). Informal rulemaking has been hailed as one of the most successful
innovations of administrative law. It is a truly democratic procedure and provides the agency
with channels of information. It is fair to all parties and produces a record by which the courts
and Congress can efficiently supervise agency action. See K. Davis, Administrative Law § 6.03
(3d ed. 1972).
15. There are many exceptions to the notice requirements of section 553. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)
(1970); see Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 743-44 (3d Cir. 1969). The food stamp program
falls naturally under the exceptions for public grants and benefits. 514 F.2d at 813. However,
USDA has waived these exceptions and subjected itself to the requirements of section 553. 36
Fed. Reg. 13,804 (1971).
16. 514 F.2d at 813.
17. Verkuil, supra note 13, at 185.
18. The two tests for judicial review of administrative action are the substantial evidence test,
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970), and the rational basis test, id. § 706(2)(A) (1970); Verkuil, supra note
13, at 206-07. The former requires a court reviewing formal rulemaking to determine whether
there is substantial evidence to support the decision. The Supreme Court, in dictum, has
suggested that this test be applied to informal rulemaking as well. Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971). Although this dictum has not been generally
accepted, the substantial evidence test was used to review informal rulemaking in United States
v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 671 (1972); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472
F.2d 659, 667-69(6th Cir. 1972). In the latter case, however, there was another act regulating judicial
review in addition to the APA. 28 U.S.C. § 2112 (1970).
The reason for invoking the substantial evidence test is to broaden the scope of review and
thereby decrease the independence of federal agencies. Verkuil, supra note 13, at 214-15.
Normally the courts apply 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970) to informal rulemaking, reversing agency
decisions only if they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." Id. This test is sometimes referred to as a rational basis test. Verkuil,
supra note 13, at 206-07. It is based on the idea that courts should defer to the expertise of
administrative bodies and allow them to rely on their own discretion. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S.
138, 142 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 748-49 (1972);
Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922 (1964).
19. See 514 F.2d at 815 n.8. Reasoned decision-making was adopted as the standard in
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 647-48 (D.C. Cir. 1973); City of
Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 741-45 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972);
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whether the Economy Food Plan provided a nutritionally adequate diet.20
That is a factual question, resolution of which is deferred to administrative
expertise. 2 ' The court's role is limited only to a determination of whether the
agency has abused its discretion. With respect to whether the allotment
system is itself sufficient, however, questions of both law and fact are
presented. That is to say, while the issue of whether the system gives
everyone a chance to purchase the Economy Food Plan is a question of fact,
the question of whether a failure to do so violates the Food Stamp Act is one
of statutory interpretation. The court could, therefore, decide the latter issue
without encroaching upon the administrative domain. 22
The three requirements of section 553 are integrally related. The elicitation
of comments is the key to the procedure. The notice requirement is intended
to inform interested parties of the substance of the proposed rule so that they
can comment upon it.23 The concise basis and purpose statement is designed
to ensure that the agency has considered the comments.2 4 It is essential,
therefore, that the notice include a sufficient description of the proposed rule
so that interested parties will understand exactly what is at stake.
Very rarely is a case remanded for failure to comply with the notice
requirements. In California Citizens Band Association v. United States, 2s a
broad notice of proposed rulemaking was held to have sufficiently described a
series of new rules for purposes of section 553. The notice did not specifically
mention some of the less important changes made in the rules, but the court
was convinced that the language of the notice was broad enough to inform
interested parties that certain actions might be taken.2 6 Other cases have
reached similar conclusions, holding either that the injured party had actual
notice,27 or that a stricter implementation of the notice requirement would
unduly burden agencies engaged in informal rulemaking. 28
In Wagner Electric Corp. v. Volpe,2 9 the Department of Transportation
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking concerning permissible failure rates in
the testing of directional and emergency lights for automobiles. The plaintiff
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 923 (1971).
20. 514 F.2d at 818.
21. Id.
22. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
23. K. Davis, Administrative Law § 6.01 (3d ed. 1972).
24. See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
25. 375 F.2d 43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967).
26. Id. at 49. The notice was much like the one in Rodway, but the Rodway court found it
insufficient. See text accompanying notes 37-41 infra.
27. Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860
(1949). The petitioner had actual notice because it was involved in adjudication concerning matters
contained in the challenged rules. Id. When a party has been actually notified, section 553 cannot be
invoked. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970).
28. Owensboro on the Air, Inc. v. United States, 262 F.2d 702, 707-08 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959). The court was concerned that a remand for a more specific notice "would
be an exercise in sheer stultification." Id. at 708.
29. 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972).
1975]
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submitted comments in which it suggested that the permissible failure rates
were interlinked with the performance criteria, so that if the former were
abolished the latter should be lowered. 30 The agency adopted these ideas and
amended both standards. However, it failed to issue a new notice of proposed
rulemaking concerning the performance criteria. 31
The agency defended its actions on two grounds. First, it argued that there
was a description of the subjects and issues involved, which is all that section
553 required. The court rejected this argument, however, since the rule, as it
finally emerged, was substantially different from that proposed in the
notice. 32 The court pointed out that there were many people, especially
consumer advocates, who had a great interest in performance criteria, but
who were not greatly concerned about permissible failure rates. These people
had been effectively excluded from the rulemaking process. 33
The agency argued, secondly, that some of the comments it had received on
the permissible failure rates had also included a discussion of the performance
criteria.34 This showed, according to the agency, that its notice was sufficient
to elicit comments on the performance criteria. The court rejected this
argument, stating that the ability of some experts to notice the intimate
connection between the two standards is not to be expected of all who have an
interest in the matter. 35 Furthermore, the failure of consumer advocates to
participate was accepted as an indication that the notice was insufficient. 36
In Rodway, USDA's primary defense of its notice procedure was similar to
that used by the Department of Transportation in Wagner. It argued that it
had given a general warning that the entire food stamp program was to be
revamped in order to comply with the 1971 amendments to the Food Stamp
Act. 37 The only mention of the allotment system in this notice, however, was
that it would be published in the Federal Register. 38
The court rejected USDA's argument, since the general notice did not
adequately inform interested parties of the particular changes to be made in
the allotment system. 39 The principal effect of the proposed rules which were
adequately published would concern the stores, banks and state agencies
participating in the program, in addition to the courts who would review the
actions. 40 These issues were of slight interest to consumer advocates and
recipients of food stamps, whose principal interest concerned the allotment
30. Id. at 1019.
31. Id. at 1015-18.
32. Id. at 1019.
33. Id. at 1019-20.
34. Id. at 1019.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1019-20.
37. 514 F.2d at 814; see 36 Fed. Reg. 7240 (1971). The argument was more plausible than in
Wagner because the notice of proposed rulemaking concerned the food stamp program as a
whole.
38. See note 6 supra.
39. 514 F.2d at 814.
40. Id.
[Vol. 44
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system. Such system had an immediate effect on the value of the stamps.
However, the rules concerning the allotment system were not adequately
published.4' As a result, the people directly affected by the changes in the
allotment system were not notified of the changes to be made in that system
and were therefore effectively excluded from the rulemaking process.
The second argument propounded by USDA in defense of its notice
procedure was that all interested parties were actually on notice concerning
the changes in the allotment system in accordance with section 553(b). 42
USDA cited the legislative history of the 1971 amendments, 43 arguing that
Congress knew the Economy Food Plan and family of four averaging system
would be used. The court disposed of this argument quickly. First, it pointed
out that even if Congress was given notice as to which allotment system
would be used, this alone could not be deemed actual notice to all interested
parties, such as the plaintiffs. 44 Nor could this serve as even constructive
notice, because only publication in the Federal Register is constructive
notice. 45 The court said that section 553 would be rendered meaningless
unless this requirement of publication were met, for the agency could always
find "inferential discussions obscurely placed throughout various federal
publications" which could be deemed notice to all interested parties. 4 6
The second requirement of section 553 follows from the first. The purpose
of the notice provisions is to allow interested parties to comment on the
proposed rules. 4 7 Solicitation of comments is the basis of informal rulemak-
ing, because it is the means by which the public participates in the rulemak-
ing process. It is also an efficient channel through which experts in the field
and those affected by the proposed rules can provide information which may
have been overlooked by the agency, can point out the abstruse effects of the
proposed rules and can suggest alternatives. 48 No comments on the allotment
system were elicited by the notice of proposed rulemaking, and this was
considered as further evidence that the general notice was insufficient to
extend to the changes in the allotment system. 49
The solicitation of comments serves another important function. Judicial
review of informal rulemaking must be based on the record kept by the
agency of its rulemaking procedure.5 0 One of the essential elements of that
record is the comments solicited from interested parties.5 ' The court noted
41. Id.
42. Id. at 815.
43. Id.; see note 70 infra.
44. 514 F.2d at 815.
45. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970).
46. 514 F.2d at 815.
47. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
48. K. Davis, Administrative Law § 6.03 (3d ed. 1972).
49. 514 F.2d at 815. USDA stated that comments were received on the allotment schedule,
but these concerned only purchase requirements and not allotments. 36 Fed. Reg. 20,148 (1971).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
51. See Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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that the lack of comments made its duty of review impossible.5 2 The situation
was aggravated by the failure of USDA to provide a statement of the basis
and purpose of the allotment system.
The basis and purpose statement is the last of the three requirements of
section 553.53 Its purpose is mainly to augment the administrative record for
purposes of judicial review. 54 Since the reviewing court is usually satisfied by
a mere showing of reasoned decision-making, a short, general statement is all
that is required.5 5 The statement must contain enough detail, however, to
inform the court of the reasons for the rule. 56 Only in this manner can the
court decide whether the rule is rational.
The new rules announced by USDA did not contain a statement of basis
and purpose when first published.57 Rather, USDA promised a later analysis
because it wished to publish the rules immediately.5 8 While it is arguable
whether this analysis sufficed for purposes of section 553, the court did not
discuss it. The court, however, found another reason for rejecting the USDA
analysis. The only reference to the allotment system in USDA's analysis was a
short statement which said that it had not been changed "in view of the
provisions of the Food Stamp Act and in order to provide for work incentives
and maintain consistency with the proposed family assistance program."5 9
The court disposed of this statement in a footnote, saying that it failed to
address the problem advanced by the plaintiffs, and that it was too general
"to show that the agency engaged in reasoned decision-making. '60
52. 514 F.2d at 817; see Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 170-71 (6th Cir.
1973).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1970).
54. See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-68 (1962).
55. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Logansport
Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24, 27-28 (D.C. Cir. 1954); see notes 18-19 supra
and accompanying text.
56. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see Automotive Parts &
Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The statement must refer to tle
comments received by the agency, in order to show that they were actually considered. See note
62 infra.
57. USDA argued that affidavits filed in the district court by two of its officials could serve as
a basis and purpose statement. It has been stated that such affidavits may be accepted by a
district court. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971);
Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1103 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974).
The Rodway court found both cases to be distinguishable. 514 F.2d at 816. In Overton Park, the
Secretary of Transportation had kept a complete administrative record of the proceeding in
question, but merely failed to provide an official explanation of his actions. Aguayo involved
informal action, see note 13 supra, so section 553 was inapplicable. Both cases accepted the
affidavits reluctantly, referring to them as "post hoc rationalizations." 401 U.S. at 419; 473 F.2d
at 1103 & n.20. Among the precedents against such a practice is Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962). See also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196
(1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
58. 36 Fed. Reg. 14,102 (1971).
59. Id. at 20,148 (1971).
60. 514 F.2d at 815 n.8; see notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text. What the court meant
by this was probably that, although the agency explained why it preferred to retain the old
(Vol. 44
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The court found yet another flaw in the basis and purpose statements
advanced by USDA. 6' These statements are supposed to respond to the
comments received by the agency, in order to show that the agency acted
rationally in the light of all available information. 62 Since no comments were
received concerning the allotment system, due to the lack of notice in- the
Federal Register, this purpose was necessarily ignored. The court seemed to
be saying that a violation of the notice or comment requirements of section
553 renders a sufficient basis and purpose statement impossible.
Mter remanding the case and ordering a new rulemaking procedure be-
cause of the failure to comply with section 553, the court addressed itself to
the merits of the case. 63 While this part of the opinion may be dicta, 64 careful
attention should be paid to it by later courts facing the same issue.65
USDA admitted that its allotment system resulted in some households being
deprived of the opportunity to purchase even the Economy Food Plan. 66 This
is because the family of four averaging plan cannot account for certain
variables which affect the nutritional requirements of individual house-
holds. 67 USDA argued, and the district court agreed, that such variables
resulted in only minor discrepancies, insufficient to justify the major burden
which a more individualized allotment system would place on the agency. 68
allotment system in general, it did not show how that system satisfied the more stringent
requirements of the amended Food Stamp Act. Since it was adopting new rules to comply with
those amendments, it should have explained why it considered the old system to be adequate.
61. 514 F.2d at 817.
62. Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-95 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 921 (1974), the court remanded the case to the Environmental Protection Agency because of
the failure of that agency to respond to comments received from the plaintiffs. In addition, the
agency had failed clearly to show a basis for the standards and did not make test results available
to the manufacturers.
63. 514 F.2d at 818-24.
64. Id. at 824 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
65. There is a difference between obiter dicta, which are general comments in passing on
issues not before the court, and judicial dicta, which are carefully considered determinations of
issues before the court that would be good law except that the case was decided on other issues.
United States v. Certain Lands in Jackson County, Mo., 69 F. Supp. 565, 568-69 (W.D. Mo.
1947); United States v. Association of Am. R.Rs., 4 F.R.D. 510, 526 (D. Neb. 1945); General
Elec. Co. v. Hygrade Sylvania Corp., 61 F. Supp. 476, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). See also
XWilliams v. Union Pac. R1R1, 94 F. Supp. 174, 177 (D. Neb. 1950); Riverside Cement Co. v.
Rogan, 59 F. Supp. 401, 404 (S.D. Cal. 1945), appeal dismissed, 153 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1946).
The dicta in Rodway was judicial because the allotment question was argued before the court as
the principal issue.
Irrespective of its precedential value, Rodway will inevitably influence the future policy of
USDA in regard to food stamp allotments. In formulating its new allotment regulations. USDA
cannot ignore the position taken by a court which may be the ultimate arbiter of those
regulations. See note 10 supra.
66. 514 F.2d at 820-21, 822 n.24.
67. Id. at 822. The variables mentioned by the plaintiffs were age, sex, health, physical
exercise, inflation and regional variations in the cost of food.
68. Rodway v. United States Dep't of Agrtculture, 369 F. Supp. 1094, 1098-99 (D.D.C.
1973).
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While the question of whether the allotment system provided the opportu-
nity for a nutritionally adequate diet was a factual issue, the allotment system
and USDA admissions raised the legal question of how far USDA may deviate
from perfection in the application of this requirement. The latter question is
legal rather than factual because it involves an interpretation of the 1971
amendment which deleted "more nearly" from the requirement of providing
an opportunity for a nutritionally adequate diet. 69
Moreover, the district court rejected the argument that the 1971
amendments to the Food Stamp Act require that recipients have the op-
portunity to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet at all times. 70
Another specific complaint addressed by the district court concerned re-
gional variations in the cost of food. 71 The plaintiffs resided in the Northeast
and alleged that the higher cost of food in those states entitled them to a larger
allotment than recipients in other parts of the country. 2 The district court
disposed of this argument by referring to price variations within the Northeast
itself which indicated that a regional differentiation in allotments would be no
more equitable. Furthermore, the court argued that regional price variations
were largely the result of food preferences, and that except for this factor, the
differences would be too small to warrant regional adjustments. 73
The court did not discuss the other factors-age, sex, health and exercise-
individually, but merely extended its loose interpretation of the 1971
amendments to them. It relied on Dandridge v. Williams, 74 to state that
imperfections in the allotment system were not a violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 75
69. 514 F.2d at 818-19; see text accompanying notes 2-4 supra.
70. 369 F. Supp. at 1097. It referred to the provisions for semi-annual adjustments In
allotments to compensate for increases in the cost of food. 7 U.S.C. § 2016(a) (1970), as amended,
(Supp. II, 1973); see note 6 supra. Before the 1973 amendments, this section provided for
annual adjustment. By allowing USDA to adjust its allotment system only twice a year, this plan
cannot accurately determine the cost of an adequate diet for each month of the year. This
willingness, of Congress, to permit minor discrepancies in the allotment system was seized upon
by the court as a rationale for denying the plaintiffs' claim for relief.
71. 369 F. Supp. at 1098-99.
72. Id. at 1098.
73. Id. at 1098-99.
74. 397 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1970). The case involved the Aid to Families With Dependent
Children Program. Maryland's ceiling on grants under the program was challenged as dis-
criminatory against large families who would get less per capita than those small enough to be
unaffected by the ceiling. The case involved statutory interpretation as well, because section
402(a)(10) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1970), requires that aid be given to
"all" applicants who have "dependent children." The Supreme Court rejected any interpretation
of the statute which would prohibit maximum grants. 397 U.S. at 478-83. This has been
described as the beginning of a new conservative Supreme Court policy which could affect all
welfare programs, including the food stamp program. See Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: Judicial
Retrenchmentin Welfare Adjudication, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 555, 626-27 (1970). In Rodway, the court of
appeals rejected the Dandridge approach as well as its conservatism, interpreting the Food Stamp
Act strictly, for the benefit of food stamp recipients.
75. 369 F. Supp. at 1098.
[Vol. 44
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The court of appeals rejected the district court's interpretation of the 1971
amendments. It disposed of the equal protection argument easily by noting
that the case involved a problem of statutory, not constitutional, interpre-
tation. 76 While the allotment system did not violate the fourteenth
amendment, it did not necessarily fulfill the requirements of the Food Stamp
Act. The court centered its discussion on the intent of Congress in amending
the statute, and concluded that, by dropping the words "more nearly" from
the requirement of providing the opportunity to purchase a nutritionally
adequate diet, Congress intended to prohibit anything at all which could limit
this opportunity. 77 It intended to expand the food stamp program from a
dietary supplement program to one which guaranteed the opportunity for an
adequate diet. 78
Since this was a case of first impression, the court had little with which to
support its opinion. It merely determined "from the face of the statute itself,
and from its legislative history" 79 that the Food Stamp Act compelled USDA
to establish an allotment system providing all recipients with the opportunity
to purchase an adequate diet. It referred to several sections of the Act which
repeated this essential demand. Moreover, it refused to admit that there was
anything in the Act which even hinted at a congressional willingness to accept
less than what was clearly demanded.8 0
USDA's argument in favor of its family of four averaging system centered
on the concept of administrative necessity. 8' The system would relieve the
agency of the burden of determining the age and sex of each child in each
household, as well as the burden of evaluating levels of health and physical
exercise of family members. Additionally there were problems of constant cost
of living adjustments and regional price variations.8 2
76. 514 F.2d at 820 n.20.
77. Id. at 818.
78. Id. at 818-19.
79. Id. at 818. The deletion of the words "more nearly" from section 2013 of Title VII was
emphasized. See notes 2-4 supra. The testimony of former Secretary of Agriculture Hardin w%-as
cited to show that the purpose of the proposed amendment was "to assure an adequate diet to all
our low-income families." Hearings on S. 6, S. 339, S. 1608, S. 1864, and S. 2014 Before the
Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 389 (1969). Also mentioned
were Hearings on H.R_ 12430 and H.R. 12222 Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. Q, pt. 1, at 8 (1969), and the original proposal for the amendment by the
President, 115 Cong. Rec. 11669 (1969). The rejection of a Senate version of the bill which would
have required adoption of the Low-Cost Food Plan, S. 2547, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1969), might
he an indication that Congress approved of the Economy Food Plan, since as the district court
pointed out, Congress knew of the Secretary's intention to use the latter Plan when it rejected the
former. 369 F. Supp. at 1097-98; see Parker, supra note 6, at 523-29. The court of appeals
rejected this argument, citing a statement by Senator Miller, 116 Cong. Rec. 44440-41 (1970).
514 F.2d at 819-20.
80. 514 F.2d at 818-20. The sections of the Food Stamp Act cited by the court were sections
2011, 2013(a), 2014(a) and 2016(a), all of which state that food stamp recipients are entitled to the
opportunity to purchase "a nutritionally adequate diet."
81. 514 F.2d at 822-23 & n.25.
82. Id. at 822 & n.25.
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The court did not completely reject this argument.8 3 It admitted that the
health and exercise categories might be too burdensome to justify indi-
vidualized computation, but left proof of this up to USDA.8 4 With regard to
other factors, the court was unconvinced by the argument of administrative
necessity. It pointed out that inflation and regional price variations are
documented by the government, so that the increased statistical burden would
be minimal.a5 Determinations of age and sex could be made easily during the
certification process, when households apply for the program. The court was
willing to allow some imperfections in the administration of the food stamp
program if administrative necessity could be shown. However, such necessity
must be demonstrated, and it cannot excuse a failure to "deliver coupons to
substantially all recipients sufficient to allow them to purchase a nutritionally
adequate diet."81 6 If USDA cannot prove that its present allotment system
satisfies the requirements of section 2013(a), 8 7 as interpreted by the court, the
agency is left with two choices. It can modify its averaging system to account
for the variables in question on an individual basis or if this proves impossi-
ble, it may maintain the averaging system and increase the average allotments
to compensate for the failures in the system. The second choice will result in
giving most recipients more than enough so that the least fortunate are
assured a sufficient allotment. 8
The court's decison was sound in regard to both the procedural and
substantive issues. It might be criticized for raising the procedural issue sua
sponte and thereby prolonging the final resolution of the plaintiffs' complaint.
This is especially true because USDA did comply with section 553 for the
most part.8 9 The court was right, however, in recognizing its duty to enforce
the rules of informal rulemaking. When agencies ignore procedures designed
to ensure public participation in the rulemaking process, the courts must
intervene to protect not only the rights of the public, but also the integrity of
the administrative branch itself.
The court was also correct in discussing the allotment issue. By addressing the
question, the court may have prevented the necessity of another trial. Its
rejection of the present allotment system upheld the clear intent of Congress as
expressed in the Food Stamp Act. Possibly, this case will stem the tide of
conservatism in welfare litigation which was forecasted following the case of
Dandridge v. Williams.90
Michael Maillet
83. Id. at 823 & n.26.
84. Id. at 823 n.26.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 823.
87. 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a) (1970).
88. 514 F.2d at 823-24.
89. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text. The court could have upheld USDA's
procedure by referring to the cases discussed in notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
90. See note 74 supra.
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Admiralty-Forum Non Conveniens-Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal
of Suit on Convenience Grounds--On January 12, 1971, the ,/V
Brandenburg, a German vessel, struck the wreckage of the SIT Texaco
Caribbean, a Panamanian vessel owned by Texaco Panama, Inc. (Texpan),
a subsidiary of Texaco, Inc. (Texaco), in the Dover Straits of the English
Channel. The Texaco Caribbean lay submerged after a collision the previous
day with the M/V Paracas, a Peruvian ship. Plaintiff foreign corporations,
Hapag-Lloyd, A.G., and Stork Amsterdam N.V. Industrias Lacteas
Dominicanas, S.A., brought suit against Texaco and Texpan in the Southern
District of New York for the loss of the Brandenburg and her cargo. In
addition, the Public Administrator of the County of New York brought suit for
the estates of twelve deceased German crewmen.I These claims alleged that the
defendants' failure to properly mark the wreckage of their ship resulted in
liability under general maritime law and the Death on the High Seas AcL
2
The district court granted the motion for dismissal under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens subject to the condition that the defendants submit to
the jurisdiction of the English courts, where Texpan and several of the cargo
and collision damage (libel) plaintiffs were already parties to suits arising from
the same series of events. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal as not an abuse of its discretion, with one judge dissenting.
Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., No. 74-1958 (2d Cir., June 25, 1975).
Both the district court and the Second Circuit applied the standards set
forth in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,3 a non-admiralty case which listed the
considerations to be used by a court entertaining a motion to dismiss under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 4 These principles are used in both
1. These suits were filed in New York so that federal discovery procedure could be used to
produce Texaco's records in New York and because American law would reach different results.
Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., No. 74-1958 (2d Cir., June 25, 1975) at 4378-80, 4385 [hereinafter
cited as Slip Opinion]. Under English law the vessel owner recovers only in proportion to his own
negligence, while the cargo owner can recover only the proportion of the negligence ascribed to
the non-carrying vessel. The amounts of damages recoverable by the estates of the deceased
seamen would be considerably less than in the United States.
2. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1970).
3. 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (5-4 decision). In that case plaintiff, a Virginia resident,
brought suit against a Pennsylvania corporation in the Southern District of New York to recover
damages for destruction of plaintiff's warehouse as a result of defendant's negligent conduct in
Virginia. The district court had dismissed the case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens
but the Second Circuit took a more restrictive view and reversed. 153 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1946).
The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the circuit court's decision.
4. These considerations include "relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may
also be questions as to the enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh
relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice
of an inconvenient forum, 'vex,' 'harass,' or'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or
trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the balance is strongly in favor
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admiralty and non-admiralty cases when the issue of forum non conveniens is
raised.5 However, the policy considerations which the Supreme Court handed
down with Gilbert and its companion case, Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co., 6 have had to be integrated with traditional admiralty approach to
the doctrine. This integration has created an inconsistency in the admiralty
decisions of the various circuits.7 Nowhere is this situation more manifest than in
admiralty cases between foreigners. 8
An early admiralty case, The Belgenland,9 involving a collision between a
Norwegian vessel and a Belgian vessel off the U.S. coastline resulting in the
loss of the former ship and its cargo, established several bases for admiralty
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that where claims arose under "the
common law of nations," special grounds would be required for a court to
deny jurisdiction to a foreign plaintiff when the court had jurisdiction over
the ship or party charged. 10 The Court's emphasis on jurisdiction over the
party charged or its assets evidenced the importance attached to the enforce-
ability of the judgment. In such a situation jurisdiction would be accepted by the
court "unless special circumstances exist to show that justice would be better
subserved by declining it. '" The Court stated that an in rem action should not
suffer dismissal as readily as an in personam action. 12 Both the Belgenland and
of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." 330 U.S. at 508 (footnote
omitted).
5. See Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in
Matters of Admiralty, 35 Cornell L.Q. 12, 12-13 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Bickel]. Justice Black,
in his dissent in Gilbert and its companion case, Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S.
518 (1947), did not accept the existence of the doctrine in the admiralty case law tradition as a
valid basis for its extension to non-admiralty actions in both law and equity, which Justice
Jackson's opinion for the court created. In Justice Black's opinion, the discretion to refuse
jurisdiction under this doctrine was "[for reasons peculiar to the special problems of admiralty and to
the extraordinary remedies of equity." 330 U.S. at 513 (Black, J., dissenting). The Koster case
involved a New York resident who brought suit against an Illinois insurance company, of which
plaintiff was a policyholder, alleging breaches of trust in the management of the company's affairs.
Id. at 519-20.
6. 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
7. Attempts at categorizing the doctrine's application in various types of cases have been made
by both observers and the courts. Such distinctions usually use different tests for those admiralty
cases involving collisions, cargo damage, personal injury, wages and others. See Comment,
Admiralty Suits Involving Foreigners, 31 Tex. L. Rev. 889, 890 passim (1953). However, even the
tests produced in these efforts are neither clearly different nor consistently applied and no clear
federal rule applicable to cases involving only foreign parties has resulted other than for personal
injury suits by alien seamen. See note 12 infra. For illustrations of inconsistent test applications,
see Annot., 10 ALR Fed. 362 (1972), and Annot., 90 ALR 2d 1109 (1963).
8. See generally Bickel, supra note 5, at 19-26.
9. 114 U.S. 355 (1885).
10. Id. at 365. For a discussion of this opinion's language and the confusion it has created, see
Bickel, supra note 5, at 35-38.
11. 114 U.S. at 367.
12. Id. See also Poseidon Schiffahrt, G.M.B.H. v. MS Netuno, 474 F.2d 203 (5th Cir.
1973). The Fifth Circuit in this decision placed the same emphasis on in rem actions, as
distinguished from those where a judgment might not be as easily enforceable. Id. at 205
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Gilbert decisions take the position that, if the judgment can be enforced without
injustice, the plaintiff's choice of forum should be upheld.' 3
Although the doctrine is "rather simple in principle" with "criteria estab-
lished in a long line of decisions,"' 14 those decisions lack consistency.t s The
discretionary power to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds 16 is more
limited than the power vested in federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), 17
which allows for transfer rather than dismissal of an action. Dismissal under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens is granted more frequently when the
court receives assurance that the defendant will submit to litigation elsewhere,
although such assurance is not required.' 8
Second Circuit cases have adhered generally to the Gilbert and Koster
criteria, while occasionally recognizing the Belgenland policy. In Fitzgerald v.
Westland Marine Corp.,'9 the Public Administrator of New York County
sought a wrongful death recovery from New York, Japanese, and Canadian
companies on behalf of the estates of foreign seamen lost in a collision off the
Alaskan coast. Citing Gilbert,20 the court noted that the witnesses resided in
Japan or Vancouver (the unwilling thereby not being subject to process and
transportation of willing being costly), there was little connection between
New York and the accident, that the suit would involve interpreting
Japanese and Canadian law, and that the decedents were foreigners. These
n.6. The Supreme Court in Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970) held that for the
statutory protection of the Jones Act to be applicable to foreign seamen suits the totality of the
circumstances must indicate that the alien shipowner's substantial and continuing contacts with
the United States outweigh any other factors against the Act's applicability. Id. at 310. Once the
Act is applicable (sufficient contacts proven), the courts will not reject jurisdiction. This test for
personal injury and death actions is contrasted with the convenience factors of the Gilbert decision
and the appropriateness considerations of the Koster opinion. See note 41 infra. The latter standards
are used in non-admiralty and admiralty cases except where the Jones Act might apply.
13. "[Ulniess the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). "[Wlhere they
[the controversies] arise under the common law of nations, special grounds should appear to
induce the court to deny its aid to a foreign suitor when it has jurisdiction of the ship or party
charged." The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 365 (1885).
14. Mobil Tankers Co., S.A. v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 363 F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 945 (1966).
15. Bickel, supra note 5, at 19.
16. "Wisely, it has not been attempted to catalogue the circumstances which will justify or
require either grant or denial of remedy. The doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court
to which plaintiff resorts, and experience has not shown a judicial tendency to renounce one's
own jurisdiction so strong as to result in many abuses." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. S01,
508 (1947). "The rule recognizing an unqualified discretion to decline jurisdiction in suits in
admiralty between foreigners appears to be supported by an unbroken line of decisions in the
lower federal courts." Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 421 (1932).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought."
18. The district court in Fitzgerald dismissed with this reservation. Slip Opinion at 4377.
19. 369 F.2d 499 (2cd Cir. 1966).
20. Id. at 501.
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inconvenience factors moved the court to dismiss because "the balance is
strongly in the favor of defendant[s]."'
In The Western Farmer,2 2 an in personam action between two non-
residents for loss of cargo, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused to
permit the district court's forum non conveniens dismissal. Although Judge
Learned Hand's opinion weighed the convenience factors, the conclusion was
that justice would not be served by removal. 23 This "justice" language was
similar to that of The Belgenland, but was not developed further by this
court.
Catherall v. Cunard S.S. Co. 24 involved a personal injury claim by a
foreign seaman against a British shipping corporation. The alleged negligence
occurred at the New York end of a passenger liner service which ran between
New York and Southampton. The court dismissed the claim because it
concluded that adequate relief was available in England. 25 This approach is
in apparent conflict with The Belgenland's policy.
26
In a non-admiralty case, Thomson v. Palmieri,27 the Second Circuit
emphasized that the central question in a forum non conveniens determina-
tion (without specifying non-admiralty) is one of convenience, citing Gilbert
and Koster.28 While this orientation is without opposition outside the admi-
ralty field, it is not the sole criterion in admiralty cases. 29 However, the
convenience approach seems to have been adopted in admiralty decisions
within the Second Circuit.
3 0
21. Id. at 501-02. While recognizing that the only possible basis of jurisdiction was under the
Jones Act, no mention of a sufficient contacts test was made even though such a standard had
been established for personal injury and death actions before Rhoditis by Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953). See note 12 supra.
22. 210 F.2d 754 (2d Cir.), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 801 (1954).
23. Id. at 756-57. The opinion points out that the usual reasons for declining jurisdiction in
this type of case are the convenience of witnesses, the enforceability of a decree, and the
convenience of the alternative forum.
24. 101 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
25. Ignoring both the Gilbert convenience criteria and The Belgenland language, the court
cited its wide discretion under Canada Malting and the rule that courts will ordinarily not "take
cognizance of the case if'justice would be as well done by remitting the parties to their home forum."
101 F. Supp. at 234, quoting Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 544 (1931).
26. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra. Another Second Circuit case seeking recovery for
personal injury involving foreign parties is Garis v. Compania Maritima San Basilio, S.A., 386
F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1967), where the court affirmed a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds
due to lack of sufficient national contacts. The court incorporated both the Lauritzen sufficient
contacts test and the convenience test.
27. 355 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1966).
28. Id. at 65-66.
29. See notes 4 & 13 supra.
30. See, e.g., Transomnia G.m.b.H. v. M/S Toryu, 311 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Galban Lobo Trading Co. S/A v. The Diponegoro, 108 F. Supp. 741, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
Strictly following the Gilbert and Koster approach of weighing competing conveniences, some
Second Circuit decisions equate whatever balance is arrived at with "justice." See cases discussed
in text accompanying notes 22-23 and 27-28 supra.
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The Third Circuit in Mobil Tankers Co. v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 3 1 where a
foreign plaintiff sought recovery for cargo and vessel damage from a U.S.
defendant, reversed a district court forum non conveniens dismissal. The
district court had concluded that trial in the U.S. would result in "very strong
inconvenience to respondent, amounting almost to injustice." 32 The circuit
court, recognizing the lack of strict criteria in the forum non conveniens
doctrine, 33 examinedthe convenience considerations as enumerated in Gilbert
and found only a slight balance in favor of a foreign forum. 34 It pointed out
that "the more important question is whether the relinquishment of juris-
diction would best serve the ends of justice." It concluded that the evidence
would not support a decision that trial would result in manifest injustice to
the respondent and thus jurisdiction was retained. 35 This approach is similar
to that of the Second Circuit where the convenience factors are weighed first,
in accord with the Gilbertand Koster cases, and then the justice of retention of
jurisdiction is considered. 36 In cargo and vessel damage cases, the Third
Circuit seems to consider more than the convenience factor per se.37
In a recent Ninth Circuit decision, Paper Operations Consultants Inter-
national, Ltd. v. SS Hong Kong Amber,38 a foreign cargo owner claimed
damages against a Liberian shipowner. There was no significant United
States involvement. The district court denied defendant's forum non con-
veniens motion and declined to consider any inconvenience to the defendant.
Rather, the court concluded that Canada was a more appropriate forum. 39
The First Circuit decisions are based on considerations similar to those of the Second Circuit.
In Zouras v. Menelaus Shipping Co., 336 F.2d 209 (1st Cir. 1964), the court affirmed the
dismissal of a Greek seaman's suit against a foreign shipping corporation because the action was
brought in rem where only an in personam action was appropriate under the Jones Act. The court
also found that in a suit under general maritime law, whether in rem or in personam, the
sufficient contacts test would apply, but the court did not view them as present there. Id. at
210-11. See also Volkenburg, P.P.A. v. Nederland-Amerik. Stoomv. Maats, 336 F.2d 480 (1st
Cir. 1964).
31. 363 F.2d 611 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 945 (1966).
32. 236 F. Supp. 362, 368 (D. Del. 1964).
33. 363 F.2d at 613-14.
34. Id. at 614. This balancing approach has specifically been rejected by the Fifth Circuit.
See text accompanying notes 48-51 infra.
35. Id. at 614-15. As in the Second Circuit's decision in The Western Farmer, the court
entertained the question of whether exercising jurisdiction would be the most just course--but
only after an examination of the convenience factors proved indecisive. In both cases the
convenience considerations were examined first and, when they proved inconclusive, a justice
criterion was applied.
36. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
37. The important but not ultimately decisive nature of the convenience factors in forum
non conveniens cases was evident in another decision within the Third Circuit, Sociedade
Brasileira De Intercambio Comercial E Industrial, Ltda. v. S.S. Punta Del Este, 135 F. Supp.
394 (D.N.J. 1955). There both parties were foreigners but the court held that the case would not
be dismissed without a showing that the balance was strongly in favor of the defendant. Id. at
397.
38. 513 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1975).
39. Id. at 669. The district court had stated: ". . . Vancouver has a more substantial
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The Ninth Circuit's affirmance did not proceed on the lower court's view of
insufficient contacts or upon Canada as a more appropriate forum. Instead,
it cited the Gilbert test of convenience factors40 and a Koster4' test. Reconcilia-
tion of this decision with The Belgenland is most difficult.
In direct contrast to these decisions which emphasize the court's discretion
and the convenience factors, the Fifth Circuit decisions exhibit a consistency
lacking in other circuit opinions. In Motor Distributors v. Olaf Pedersen's
Rederi A/S, 4 2 foreign cargo owners sought, against foreign shipping interests,
claims based on events which occurred outside the territory of the United
States. The district court dismissed on the ground that all the parties in
connection with the action, and trial there would be more appropriate ...
.. While the defendants' agent did tell the plaintiff to process the claim in San Francisco, tile
Court does not think that this is enough to make the tax-payer in the United States pay the cost of
litigation. It would seem that Vancouver is a more appropriate forum and that San Francisco has
the least contact of any place with the transaction." Id. at 669 (emphasis deleted). This reasoning
involving, sufficient contacts is deemed appropriate in cases of personal injury recovery under the
Jones Act. Apparently no other cargo damage case has listed this theory as relevant.
40. Id. at 671.
41. Id. at 672. See Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947) (chosen
forum inappropriate due to considerations affecting the court's administrative and legal prob-
lems). The court also relied on Hoffman v. Goberman, 420 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1970), a non-admir-
alty case which cited language from the Koster opinion in dismissing a claim under the doctrine
of forum non conveniens: "There must be a clear showing of facts which either (1) establish
such oppression and vexation of a defendant as to be out of all proportion to the plaintiff's
convenience, which may be shown to be slight or nonexistent, or (2) make trial in the chosen
forum inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal
problems." Id. at 426-27. Other cases within the Ninth Circuit have applied the convenience test.
In Michael v. SS Thanasis, 311 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Cal. 1970), German citizens sued a Liberian
vessel and its Panamanian owner for cargo damage after a fire on board while in the Philippines.
The court concluded that the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice would be bet-
ter served if the court retained jurisdiction. Id. at 182 (citing Gilbert, Koster and Canada Malt-
ing). See also The Kanto Maru, 112 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1940). However, the latest Ninth
Circuit decision in this area, Philippine Packing Corp. v. Maritime Co. of the Philip-
pines, 519 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (PPC), tried to harmonize
these apparently contradictory theories. The action, involving Philippine corporations as
both plaintiff and defendant, was brought for damage to and loss of cargo on a Panamanian
vessel. The cargo was en route from Japan, and the contract of carriage called for Japanese law
to govern its terms. The opinion relied on Canada Malting to affirm the exercise of the district
court's discretion to refuse jurisdiction on the grounds of forum non conveniens. The court first
mentioned the inconvenience of securing witnesses' testimony, the defendant's agreement In the
district court to submit to Philippine or Japanese jurisdiction, and other convenience factors. It
went on to distinguish the conflicting Fifth Circuit decision, Poseidon Schiffahrt, G.M.B.H. v.
M/S Netuno, 474 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1973), as strictly applicable to in rem cases based on The
Belgenland, without taking into account the clarification of that case in Canada Malting. 519 F. 2d at
813. See text accompanying notes 54-57 infra. According to the Ninth Circuit, the policy standards of
The Belgenland were modified by Canada Malting's emphasis on discretion. In addition The
Belgenland was an in rem action, while Canada Malting and PPC were in personam. Id. This
distinction between in rem and in personam actions is one which the other decisions, even within the
Ninth Circuit, have not always made.
42. 239 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957).
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interest were citizens of foreign states. 43 In reversing the district court for
abuse of its discretion, the Fifth Circuit cited the language of The Belgen-
land4 4 and applied a standard not explicitly used by any of the other circuits:
"Instead of the rule being, as the trial court here stated, that jurisdiction
should be denied unless such denial would work an injustice, the rule is,
rather, that jurisdiction should be taken unless to do so would work an
injustice. '45 The court went on to find a new rule of law in The Belgenland
opinion requiring jurisdiction to be accepted in admiralty cases where the
parties are foreigners of different nations and there are no special circum-
stances.
46
In a more recent case involving an in rem libel action between foreign
vessels of different nationalities, Poseidon Schiffahrt, G.M.B.H. v. MIS
Netuno ,'47 the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of the case
based on the balancing tests and applied the standard developed in Motor
Distributors. The opinion traced the derivation of the standard from The
Belgenland through the Second Circuit's The Western Farmier49 to Motor
Distributors and stated that the standard was to be used in all in rem (cargo
or vessel damage) cases where a motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum
non conveniens is raised.50
The disparity between the different approaches used in various circuits is
clear. The only standard which lends itself to uniform application is the Fifth
Circuit's, which establishes a framework within which the courts can operate
by allowing sufficient discretion to avoid any injustice.5 1 The Second and
Third Circuit decisions examined seem to hold the convenience considerations
as the crucial, if not the sole, criterion.5 2 However, decisions of both circuits
have language which is more directed toward justice criteria.5 3 In all of the
43. Id. at 464.
44. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
45. 239 F.2d at 465. The court distinguished Canada Malting as a case where all significant
national contacts were to one and the same country. A refusal to entertain jurisdiction is required
in such cases to serve justice. For language similar to that which the circuit court overruled in an
earlier district court decision in the Fifth Circuit, see Papanikolaou v. Atlantic Freighters, 140 F.
Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1954) (some good reason should be made to appear for accepting
jurisdiction).
46. "Ihe Supreme Court came very close to prescribing an absolute rule of law where it
said: 'Indeed, where the parties are not only foreigners, but belong to different nations, and the
injury or salvage service takes place on the high seas, there seems to be no good reason why the
party injured, or doing the service, should ever be denied justice in our courts.' " 239 F.2d at 467,
quoting 114 U.S. at 368-69.
47. 474 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1973).
48. Id. at 205.
49. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
50. "[T]he standard formulated in Motor Distributors is not to be restricted to the facts in
that case. The purpose of the Motor Distributors rule is to furnish a framework-a method of
analysis-to be used in all cases involving an in rein libel arising from a collision between foreign
vessels of different nationalities." 474 F.2d at 205 n.6.
51. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
52. See text accompanying notes 19-37 supra.
53. See notes 22-23 & 35-37 supra. Some cases do not distinguish between the personal injury
19751
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opinions, however, it appears that a decision is made before any legal criteria
are examined. This was the situation in the Fitzgerald case.
The majority opinion in Fitzgerald cited convenience factors, such as the
residence of witnesses and the lack of federal subpoena powers over relevant
evidence, and concluded that the plaintiffs would not be seriously inconven-
ienced by dismissal.5 4 The fact that the law of the alternative forum may be
less favorable to the plaintiffs is not to be considered."s The court never
reached the question the Fifth Circuit would pose-whether retaining
jurisdiction would work an injustice. No justice criteria were considered
beyond the elements of justice which are incorporated into the convenience
standards.
Judge Oakes' dissent carefully attacked the majority opinion from two
standpoints. He first questioned whether the traditional admiralty (and non-
admiralty) forum non conveniens standards are still functional. 5 6 This ques-
tion becomes increasingly important in light of the recent Supreme Court
abandonment of the traditional divided damages doctrine in United States v.
Reliable Transfer Co., s 7 which Judge Oakes interpreted as suggesting that
"some of those cobwebs need cleaning out."58 The Fitzgerald dissent realis-
tically noted that a myth of registry hides U.S. interests which should be
considered in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction. In Fitzgerald the
U.S. interest was obviously substantial, although veiled by the Panamanian
registry.5 9 Other factors modern admiralty courts must consider in removing
the "cobwebs" are: the extent to which modern transportation may have made
no forum too inconvenient or too costly in relation to the size of admiralty
complaints, 60 and the radical changes in shipping practices over the last few
years which have had a significant effect on "the entire concept of national
suzerainty over international waters." '6'
The dissent put Fitzgerald to the traditional Gilbert convenience test and
concluded that the balance might be slightly in favor of trial in England but
not so great as to require dismissal. 62 The substantial possibility that the
criteria and the cargo or vessel damage criteria, while others use the convenience factors for
personal injury cases.
54. Slip Opinion at 4378-82. The court relied mainly upon Gilbert and Koster in reaching this
conclusion. Mention was also made of the Lauritzen "contacts" test. Id. at 4386.
55. Id. at 4384, citing Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., 285 U.S. 413, 418-20 (1932).
56. Id. at 4386 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
57. 95 S. Ct. 1708 (1975).
58. Slip Opinion at 4386.
59. Id. at 4387-88.
60. Id. at 4389.
61. Id. E.g., the English Channel is no longer an exclusively English or French concern. Id.
at 4389-90. The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea of the United Nations, after two lengthy
sessions in 1974-75, has prepared negotiating texts dealing with the sea-bed and ocean floor, the
territorial sea to a twelve nautical mile limit, an economic resource zone of 200 miles and protection of
the marine environment. it is expected that these texts will be the foundation of a new series of
international conventions.
62. Id. at 4391.
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seamen's estates would be precluded from any recovery in the English courts
was viewed as another factor favoring retention in New York.
63
The Fitzgerald decision indicates that the discretion which the federal
courts now retain in jurisdictional determinations involving admiralty suits
between foreigners is grounded in such vague policy considerations that little
hope exists for uniformity of approach in the near future without direction
from the Supreme Court.64 Although the Fifth Circuit's standards may not be
the most desirable, they nonetheless provide guidelines for the courts in
certain classes of cases. The recent Supreme Court decision in Reliable
Transfer indicates that this direction may be forthcoming, as indeed it must,
if the parties are to avoid a waste of time, money and effort "in suits which
would never have been brought and on motions which would never have been
argued if lines of demarcation and guidance had been drawn by someone." 65
Arthur Ruegger
Civil Procedure-Ninth Circuit Refuses Precertification Notice to
Potential Plaintiffs.-Two airline crashes, one near Paris, France and the
other at American Samoa, created the possibility of a large amount of
litigation.' To insure uniform decisions on the issue of liability and to avoid
costly duplication of proceedings, 2 the United States District Court for the
Central District of California3 planned to notify potential plaintiffs of their
opportunity to intervene 4 in actions already pending,5 one of which had been
63. Id. at 4393.
64. Supreme Court reluctance, if not diffidence, respecting the rights of cargo owners against
carriers is illustrated by the treatment afforded the problem in The Monrosa v. Carbon Black
Export Co., 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
65. Bickel, supra note 5, at 19.
1. Between 346 and 360 persons died in the Paris crash. Ninety-seven persons died in the Samoa
crash. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1. 3,
9, 2 (9th Cir. 1975); see note 5 infra.
2. "It is the history of such crashes that suits . . . are filed in several, sometimes many,
different jurisdictions, which results in lengthy duplicated proceedings and which are extraor-
dinarily costly to both plaintiffs and defendants and sometimes with different results unless some
means for common discovery and trial on the issue of liability can be found." Id. at 9 n. 10.
3. All the suits affected by this decision were assigned to Judge Pierson Hall, the senior judge
of the Central District of California who has had a great deal of experience with airline crash
litigation. Id. at 10 (Schnacke, J., dissenting.).
4. "I deem it my duty as a judge in this case to see that everyone lbvith a possible claim]
should be notified as soon as possible that these actions are pending here, and that they may go
here or any place they please if they wish to come here and take advantage of what is going on in
this court, they may do so, but if they wish not to do so, that is their privilege, and that certainly
is not solicitation to me." Id. at 4 n. 1.
5. At least ten actions arising from the Paris crash had been consolidated in the Central
District of California by order of the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Defendants in these actions
included the manufacturer of the plane, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, and the United States,
1975]
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filed as a class action. 6 During pretrial hearings in a case arising from the
Paris crash, the court informed defendant that it intended to order production
of a list of the names and addresses of passengers and their next of kin. The
court further stated that these potential plaintiffs would be notified of the
actions pending before it. In a case arising out of the crash at American
Samoa, the court, on its motion, simply ordered defendant to file a sealed list
of crash victims and their survivors.8 In both cases, the district court had not
yet determined that the situation met the requirements of rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants moved to restrain the court
from seeking any such list or sending notice. Both motions were denied.
Defendants then sought certification of an interlocutory appeal.
After certification was denied, 9 defendants filed petitions for mandamus'0
seeking to prevent the district court from communicating with the survivors
of crash victims. The Ninth Circuit granted the petitions, I" holding that due
process did not require notice and no source of judicial authority permitted
joined because of the alleged failure of the F.A.A. to properly certify and inspect the plane.
Another twenty-four actions arising from the Samoa crash were filed against the operator of
the jet, Pan American World Airways, Inc., and its manufacturer, Boeing Company. Most of
these actions were filed in the Central District of California and, at the time this opinion was
written, the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation was considering a motion to transfer the remaining
cases to that forum. Id. at 3, 9.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 12. Subsequently, the district court determined that rule 23 was satisfied. Therefore,
plaintiffs argued that the petitions at issue here were moot since notice could now be sent to class
members as a matter of course. However, on the same day that this opinion was written, the
Ninth Circuit in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d II,
(9th Cir. 1975) also granted mandamus to vacate the district court's certification of a class action. Id.
at 14.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970) provides: "When a district judge, in making in a civil action an
order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves
a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, In its
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order .
10. See Id. § 1651(a) (1970).
11. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d at 4. The Ninth Circuit found mandamus to be an appropriate remedy
for three reasons. First, notice to potential plaintiffs not authorized explicitly by statute or rule is so
extraordinary that interlocutory review would not frustrate the purpose of the finality rule, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1970). See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382-83 (1953) (All Writs Act to
be used only in exceptional cases). Second, in the course of appeal after final judgment, petitioners
could not be relieved of the burden of actions filed in response to the district court's notice. See id. at
384; De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 US. 212, 217 (1945) (injury caused by
preliminary injunction could not be redressed absent interlocutory review). Finally, in view of the
holding on the merits, it appeared that the district court did not merely err but intended to act beyond
its power. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 94-96 (1967) (ordering information not"usurpation of
power" justifying mandamus); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110 (1964) (ordering mental or
physical examination of defendant in tort case justified mandamus).
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it.' 2 The district court was ordered to refrain from contacting persons whose
claims were not already before the court, unless and until a class action was
properly certified.' 3 Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States
District Court, 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1 (9th Cir. 1975).
The district court had not specified the authority under which it intended to
notify nonlitigants.14 However, rule 23 is the likely source of support for the
proposed notice because of its flexibility's and its recognition of broad judicial
discretion. 16
As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, rule 23(c)(1) requires the court to determine whether it shall be
maintained as a class action.'7 Once a class action is certified, the rule
explicitly requires notification of absent class members in only two situations 8
first, under subdivision (c)(2), 19 whenever a court decides that a subdivi-
sion (b)(3) action shall be maintained; second, under section (e), 2' whenever
dismissal or compromise of an action is proposed. 2' Some courts have stated
that due process requires notice in all class actions22 because the absent
12. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d at 5.
13. Id. at 10.
14. See notes 2 & 4 supra.
15. E.g., Forbes v. Board of Realtors, 61 F.R.D. 416, 417 (D. Minn. 1973); Kronenberg v.
Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 7A C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1796, at 223-24 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Wright &
Miller].
16. Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 334 (1973); Wilcox v.
Commerce Bank, 474 F.2d 336,344(10th Cir. 1973); see 1 Pt. 2 J. Moore, Federal Practice, $1.43, at
37 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Moore].
17. This determination depends upon satisfaction of the prerequisites listed in section (a) and of
the provisions stated in at least one of the three subdivisions of section (b). Amendments to Rules
of Civil Procedure, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104 (1966) (hereinafter cited as
Advisory Note]; see 7A Wright & Miller, supra note 15, § 1785, at 132; Donelan, Prerequisites to
a Class Action Under New Rule 23, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 527 (1969); Comment, Rule 23;
Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 539 (1969); Comment, Making the Class
Determination in Rule 23 (bX3) Class Actions, 42 Fordharn L Rev. 791 (1974).
18. See 3B Moore, supra note 16, 23.72, at 23-142 1.
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-77 (1974).
20. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides: "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
21. Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971);
see Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971); Rothman v. Gould, 52
F.R.D. 494, 497-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720, 732
(M.D. Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971).
22. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-75 (1974); Bormaan v. Long Island
Press Publ. Co., 379 F. Supp. 951, 954 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Brandt v. Owens-illinois, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 160,
171 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (supplemental opinion); Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78, 85-86 & n.8
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Lopez v. Wyman, 329 F. Supp. 483,486 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 404 U.S. 1055
(1972); Zachary v. Chase Manh. Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The rationale of these cases
has been criticized as unduly restricting the discretion of the trial court. Johnson v. Baton Rouge, So F.R.D.
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parties will be bound by the judgment. 23 However, the rule does not demand
notice to class members in actions maintained under subdivisions (b)(1) and
(b)(2), since these classes are generally more cohesive and due process should
be satisfied by an effective representative. 24 In addition, subdivision (d)(2) 25
restates the inherent judicial power to contact absent parties whenever the
court deems it advisable to do so. 26 This discretionary power to send notice
can be used, together with section (e) notice, to protect class members in
any action maintained under rule 23.27
The procedure of certification is flexible. 28 The district court may certify a
class action tentatively29 and, if the situation falls within subdivision (c)(2)30
or section (e), 31 notice should be sent to class members.32 However, a class
295, 301 (E.D. La. 1970); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan.
1968), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
951 (1971).
23. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(cX3) provides: "The judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under subdivision (b)(1) or (bX2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a
class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who
have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class."
24. Advisory Note, supra note 17, at 106; 3B Moore, supra note 16, 23.72, at 23-1421-22;
7A Wright & Miller, supra note 15, § 1786, at 142-43, § 1793, at 202.
25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d) provides in pertinent part: "[Tjhe court may make appropriate
orders: ...(2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair
conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all
of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the
opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to
intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action . .. ."
26. Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 328 (1973) ("Basically
Rule 23(dX2) is a catch-all and merely codifies the inherent judicial power to give notice to absent
parties whenever the court deems it advisable to do so.'); see 7A Wright & Miller, supra note 15,
§ 1793, at 201; Newberg, Orders in the Conduct of Class Actions: A Consideration of Subdivision
(d), 10 B.C. Ind. & Coin. L. Rev. 577 (1969); cf. 3B Moore, supra note 16, 23.72, at 23-1421-23.
27. 7A Wright & Miller, supra note 15, § 1786, at 144.
28. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) provides in pertinent part: "An order under this subdivision may
be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits."
29. E.g., Goldstein v. Regal Crest, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 571, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Seligson v. Plum
Tree, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 343, 344-45 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Forbes v. Board of Realtors, 61 F.R.D. 416, 417
(D. Minn. 1973). But see Albertson's, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 62 F.R.D. 43, 54 (D. Utah
1973),modified, 503 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1974) (courts should avoid unduly burdening absent parties
by improper certification).
30. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
31. See note 19 supra.
32. E.g., Goldstein v. Regal Crest, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 571, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Forbes v. Board
of Realtors, 61 F.R.D. 416, 418 (D. Minn. 1973); Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc.,
41 F.R.D. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Although the rule requires notice in these situations, the court, in
its discretion, may postpone the notice until the suitability of class treatment is more firmly
established. E.g., Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 343, 344-45 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377,
386 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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action certification is always revocable. 33 After the class has been notified, the
court may decertify the action, if, in its view, subsequent circumstances
require the striking of class action allegations. 34 The members of the dissolved
class, having been informed of their rights, 35 may be permitted to intervene
36
in the original action or they may institute separate actions.
Several commentators have asserted that no notice is necessary until after a
class action has been certified, at least tentatively. 37 However, in some cases
notice is sent before any class determination has been made. For purposes of
section (e), 3 8 a suit filed as a class action is assumed to be one. 3 9 If a
compromise or dismissal is proposed, notice must still be sent to members of
the purported class. 40 In such a case, due process considerations might require
notice even absent section (e) because the statute of limitations may run while
nonparties are relying on the class suit.4 1 Conversely, when no such problem
is present, the court can approve a voluntary dismissal without requiring
notice. 42
The assumption of class status prior to certification is not limited to cases
33. Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 343, 344-45 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Arey v. Providence
Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62, 70 (D.D.C. 1972); Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton. Inc., 41 F.R.D.
42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
34. Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 466 F.2d 1374, 1376 (10th Cir. 1972), aff'g 50
F.R.D. 213 (D. Colo. 1970). Cf. Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 45
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). Gerstle was a civil rights action. Private suits in this area, and to a lesser extent,
those in antitrust and consumer protection, have been viewed as public interest litigation,
prompting a liberal construction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 7 & 7A Wright &
Miller, supra note 15, §§ 1771, 1781; see, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Ass'n. v. Board of Educ., 446
F.2d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 1971) (race discrimination); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d
1194, 1201 (7th Cir.), cerLt. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971) (sex discrimination); Esplin v. Hirschi,
402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1968) (securities fraud).
35. Ordinarily, notice under subdivision (c)(2) does not require any response by absent
parties. However, in Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 466 F.2d 1374, 1376 (10th Cir. 1972),
aff'g 50 F.R.D. 213 (D. Colo. 1970), the lower court had included an "opt in" clause in the notice
which required those who wished to remain in the class to appear through counsel at a pretrial
conference. If this had not been the situation, when the court decertified the action, notice under
subdivision (d)(2) would have been required, advising of the demise of the class action. Cf.
Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 343, 346 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
36. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.
37. E.g., Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.RLD. 39,
40-41 (1967); Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View. 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.
Rev. 515, 521 (1969).
38. See note 20 supra.
39. E.g., Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 713, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Philadelphia Elec. Co.
v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326-28 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
40. E.g., Duncan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 66 F.R.D. 615, 616 (E.D. Wis. 1975);
Rotzenburg v. Neenah Jt. School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 181, 182 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
41. Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.RID. 494, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v.
Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.RID. 324, 327-28 (E.D. Pa. 1967); see Frankel, Some Preliminary
Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 40 (1967).
42. Elias v. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 276 (D. Minn. 1973); cf. Berse v.
Berman, 60 F.R.D. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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under section (e).43 It may be employed for such other purposes as
determining jurisdiction,44 considering applications for intervention, 4s and
controlling the activities of the named parties. 46 It has been asserted that the
assumption should be for all purposes. 47
The issue of the court's power to send notice concerning matters other than
compromise or dismissal rarely has arisen, even in those cases which have
assumed class status. 48 Communications initiated by the named parties to
members of the alleged class, although controlled by the court to avoid
unseemly claim solicitation, may not be prohibited entirely. 49 Otherwise,
effective preparation of a case might be prevented and the potential class
members could be deprived of their constitutional right of meaningful access
to the courts.50 It appears that the district court also may send precertification
notice within its discretion in managing a class action. 5 In one case, pros-
pective plaintiffs were informed by the court that defendant was prohibited
from communicating with them regarding settlement of their actual or possi-
ble claims.5 2 The court issued this notice to prevent defendant from frustrat-
ing the class action device.5 3 In another case, the named parties proposed a
43. See 3B Moore, supra note 16, 23.50, at 23-1103; 7A Wright & Miller, supra note 15,
§ 1785, at 130-31.
44. City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1971).
45. McCausland v. Shareholders Mgt. Co., 52 F.R.D. 521, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
46. Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 647, modified, 55
F.R.D. 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), appeal dismissed, 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972). "It would be a
strange rule, indeed, where a court would be powerless to deal with what it considered abuses
because the litigation had not reached a certain stage." 53 F.R.D. at 651.
47. Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 624, 627 (C.D. Cal. 1972); "Until the court has
ruled that an action cannot continue as a class action, it must be regarded as a class action if the
pleadings so provide, and the procedural provisions applicable to class actions ... are controlling."
Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 182 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
48. In one case, defendant supplied a list of potential plaintiffs, apparently without ques-
tioning the court's power to send precertification notice. Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp
624, 627 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
49. See 1 Pt. 2 Moore, supra note 16, 1.41, at 27-32; 7A Wright & Miller, supra note 15,
§ 1796, at 225; see, e.g., Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3033 (May 27, 1975)(No. 1483), noted in 43 Fordham L. Rev. 1086(1975);
American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572 (D. Md. 1974); Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight
WatchersInt'l, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 647, modified, 55 F.R.D. 50(E.D.N.Y. 1971), appeal dismissed, 455
F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972).
50. 1 Pt. 2 Moore, supra note 16, 1.41, at 30; see United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401
U.S. 576, 585 (1971).
51. See note 25 supra.
52. Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 559 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d
1278 (5th Cir. 1975). The majority in Pan Am did not discuss any similar problems, However,
the dissent noted defendant's desire to settle with survivors of crash victims while they remained
ignorant of the actions pending in California. This may be of importance to the defendants in the
actions arising from the Paris crash, since the great majority of the passengers were not
Americans. Presumably, non-residents of the United States would be less aware of an available
forum in this country. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d at 3, 11.
53. 61 F.R.D. at 559.
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settlement but withdrew it when ordered to send section 23(e) notice.54
Nevertheless, the court sent notice under subdivision (d)(2) to encourage
intervention by members of the purported class and, thereby, to prevent
abuse of rule 23 by such vacillation. Moreover, an Advisory Committee Note
to the 1966 Amendment explicitly recognizes the discretionary power of the
court to contact the alleged class before it decides that the class action is
maintainable:
Whether the court should require notice to be given to members of the class of its
intention to make a determination, or of the order embodying it, is left to the court's
discretion under subdivision (d)(2). 55
Even a refusal to grant class action status may not preclude notice.5 6 Some
courts still have contacted members of the potential class for economic and
practical reasons despite the refusal of class treatment.57 Nonlitigants, having
been made aware of their rights, may intervene in the original action ss or file
separate actions. s 9 The Advisory Committee Note also supports this proce-
dure. 60
Rule 21 is another source of authority for giving notice to potential
plaintiffs. 6 1 Respondents in Pan Anmerican asserted that an independent
power to direct notice to potential plaintiffs must be included within the
54. Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 499-500 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Here defendants argued
that the proposed notice was contrary to the "letter and spirit of Rule 23" and unsupported by any
reported case authority. They noted that the case was unlikely to be certified because of the lack
of a proper representative and that the notice threatened to arouse unnecessary litigation. The
court, however, found that the sending of notice was within its discretion under subdivision (d).
Id. at 499-500.
55. Advisory Note, supra note 17, at 104.
56. Alexander v. Avco Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1282 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (civil rights action); City
& County of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971) (antitrust action). The
public interest aspects of these cases may well have caused both courts to take a more active role
than usual. See note 34 supra.
57. "Having determined that this shall not be a class action is not to say that attention should
not be paid to attempting to effect economies of litigants' and the court's time." City & County of
Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 638 (D. Colo. 1971).
58. "In essence, notice is given of the court's decision that the case is not to be maintained as
a class action, and the recipients of the notice are told that they may apply to intervene within 45
days." Id. at 639. See Alexander v. Avco Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
59. This option would not be available to those who received notice if the applicable statute
of limitations had run. Indeed, this possibility may be an important factor in a court's decision to
invite intervention. Alexander v. Avco Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). Where
absent individuals may have relied upon the filing of the class action to toll the statute, the court
must consider whether these nonlitigants would be deprived of due process if they were not
afforded an opportunity to intervene. Id. See Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 40
(1967); see also American Pipe and Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
60. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
61. Fed. R Civ. P. 21 provides in pertinent part: "Parties may be dropped or added by
order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are just."
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court's power to order joinder. 62 However, rule 21 relies on rules 1963 and
2064 for standards to determine which parties can or must be joined. 65 Rule
19 would be apposite if complete relief could not be granted to the named
parties without the presence of other claimants. 66 Alternatively, it would
apply if the defendants or the absent parties themselves might be injured by
their exclusion from the case. 67 Permissive joinder under rule 20 ordinarily
applies only to persons asserting a claim at present.6 8 Some courts, acting
under rule 21, have joined potential plaintiffs who meet the requirements of
rule 20 and who subsequently consent to be joined.69 However, these cases
concern the joinder of four parties or less.70 None discuss notice,7t and most
indicate that the joined parties previously had expressed a desire to enter the
action. 7
2
Rule 42, which authorizes consolidation and other orders aimed at
economy and efficiency, could be construed to sanction notice to potential
plaintiffs. The rule concerns "actions ... pending before the court. '73 However,
future actions, which predictably will be filed, might delay and increase the cost
of present actions. 74 Rule one specifies that all the rules must be construed "to
62. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d at 7-8. The Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 Amendment of rule
19 describes a notice procedure very similar to the one attempted in this case: "In some situations It
may be desirable to advise a person who has not been joined of the fact that the action is pending, and
in particular cases the court in its discretion may itself convey this information by directing a letter or
other informal notice to the absentee." Advisory Note, supra note 17, at 93-94.
63. See notes 66 & 67 infra.
64. Rule 20(a) provides in pertinent part- "All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs If
they assert any right to relief ... arising out of the same transaction, (or] occurrence ... and if
any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action."
65. See 7 Wright & Miller, supra note 15, §§ 1681, 1683.
66. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1).
67. Id. 19(a)(2).
68. See note 64 supra; see also 7 Wright & Miller, supra note 15, § 1652, at 264 n.29.
69. Kincade v. Mikles, 144 F.2d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 1944) (two mortgagees joined); Gilbert v.
General Elec. Co., 347 F. Supp. 1058, 1059-61 (E.D. Va. 1972) (joinder for jurisdictional and
venue purposes in civil rights action); Zarate v. State Dep't of Health and Rehab. Serv., 347 F.
Supp. 1004, 1006 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (3-judge court), aff'd mem., 407 U.S. 918 (1972) (individual
joined in challenge of citizenship and durational residency requirements for welfare); Rekeweg v.
Federal Mut. Ins. Co., 27 F.R.D. 431, 435 (N.D. Ind. 1961), aff'd on other grounds, 324 F.2d
150 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 943 (1964) (individual joined to avoid repetitious suit).
70. There were two exceptions. In Adams v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 7 F.R.D. 48 (W.D.N.Y.
1947), 171 persons were joined but this was a class action authorized by statute. Gilbert v.
General Elec. Co., 347 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Va. 1972), involved the joinder of an unspecified
number of plaintiffs for jurisdictional and venue purposes.
71. Several of the cases involved attempts to add a party by amending the pleadings.
Subsequently, the court, sua sponte, ordered the party joined. E.g., Zarate v. State Dep't of
Health and Rehab. Serv., 347 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
72. E.g., Adams v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 7 F.R.D. 48 (W.D.N.Y. 1947) (employees indicated a
desire to join with their co-workers in a suit for overtime wages).
73. Fed R. Civ. P. 42(a).
74. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d at 10 (Schnacke, J., dissenting). The district judge found "that the
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secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.""75
Finally, there remain the district court's equitable powers, which consist of
those possessed by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the passage of
the first Judiciary Act in 1789.76 They have been used to supplement rule 23
with regard to attorney's fees,7 7 since rule 23 fails to provide for payment of
such fees. However, these powers have never included the ability to notify
potential plaintiffs who were not proper parties for joinder. 7 8 A sex dis-
crimination case, 79 upheld a procedure of forming and notifying a class after the
decision on the merits despite its clear conflict with rule 23.80 However, this case
relied directly on the policies underlying the Civil Rights Act.8'
prompt disposition of [airline crash] cases is likely to be much complicated, long delayed, and far
more costly if the disposition of actions pending before him must await the last of such cases which
may reasonably be expected to come before him .... ." Id.
75. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. This is a rule of construction and does not convey authority to create
new rules.
76. See, e.g., Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563,568(1939); Alkire v. Interstate
Theatres Corp., 379 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 (D. Mass. 1974); see generally Beale, Equity in America, I
Cambridge L. J. 21 (1921); Glenn & Redden, Equity. A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 Va. L. Rev.
753 (1945); Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 Fordham L. Rev. 23 (1951); von
Moschzisker, Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 287 (1927).
77. Rule 23 does not mention attorney's fees, so the equitable fund doctrine stated in Sprague
v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939), which requires all beneficiaries of a recovery to pay
their share of litigation expenses, has been used to award attorney's fees in rule 23 cases. E.g.,
City of Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469 (2d Cir. 1974).
78. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d at 51.
79. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971).
80. This is an example of the liberal procedure used in civil rights cases. One reason for
amending rule 23 was to avoid such "one way intervention," a technique considered unfair to
defendants. Advisory Note, supra note 17, at 105. The procedure attempted by the district court
in the instant case also appears similar to that used in the "spurious" actions managed under
subdivision (a)(3) of the old rule 23; i.e., only those members of the class who intervene wvill be
bound by the judgment. In contrast, under present subdivision (b)(3), only those who "opt out"
after receiving notice will be excluded from the judgment. See Hirschi v. B & F Sec., Inc., 41
F.R.D. 64 (D. Utah 1966). Prof. Kaplan, in considering this case, stated that "while disallowving
the class features of the action in Hirschi, the judge allowed the action to stand for the individual
plaintiff with an indication that interventions would be welcomed. The result is something on the
order of a spurious action as it was conceived under the old rule, in contrast to the (b)(3) action
under the new." Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 395 n.151 (1967) (italics omitted). The
similarity with a "spurious" action is limited, however, since the Hlrschi court declined to notify
members of the potential class of their opportunity to intervene. 41 F.R.D. at 69. But see notes
56-60 supra and accompanying text.
81. 444 F.2d at 1201. "In its present posture, this case presents the bald question of the
court's power to grant such relief where justice requires such action. In our opinion, Rule 23 to
the contrary notwithstanding, the district court possesses such power in Title VII cases.... The
vindication of the public interest expressed by the Civil Rights Act constitutes an important facet
of private litigation under Title VII." Id.
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A court has "the power to manage [its] own affairs so as to achieve the
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."' 82 Until now, however, absent
the support of a specific statute or rule,8 3 no court has attempted to manage
its case load by sending notice to potential plaintiffs.8 4
In Pan American v. United States District Court respondents argued that the
due process clause of the fifth amendment entitled potential plaintiffs to notice of
pending actions in which they might join.85 However, absent class certification,
the nonparties would not be bound by the judgment in the action.8 6 Therefore,
the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument, holding that notice was not required
since no interest of the nonparties was threatened.8 7
The court then considered seriatim the sources of discretionary power
which allegedly authorized the proposed notice to potential plaintiffs. The
majority felt that the arguments based upon rules 21, 23 and 42, all
supplemented by rule 1,88 deserved the most detailed consideration.
The court pointed out that rule 21 depended on rules 19 and 20 for the
proper standards for joinder. However, rule 19 was deemed inapposite
because complete relief could be granted to the named parties without the
presence of other claimants and neither the defendants nor the absent parties
would be injured by their exclusion from the case.8 9 Similarly, the rule 20 basis
for joinder was rejected since the vast majority of previous cases had involved
four or fewer persons and not hundreds as in the present case. Joinder of such a
82. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d at 10. (Schnacke, J., dissenting); accord, Link v. Wabash R.R., 370
U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); Peoples v. Wainwright, 325 F. Supp. 402, 403 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
83. See notes 48-55 and 79-81 supra and accompanying text.
84. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d at 6 & n.3.
85. Respondents were unable to cite a single case in support of this proposition. Id. at 5.
86. See Moore, supra note 16, 23.60, at 23-1201 to 04; note 23 supra.
87. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d at 5. The situation is quite different once a class action has been
certified. Then all class members would be bound by the final judgment, whether favorable or not. In
a subdivision (bX3) class action, subdivision (cX2) mandates the best notice practicable to class
members, including individual notice. This notice is required to afford class members a realistic
opportunity to "opt out" and thereby protect their claims from the res judicata effect of the class
action. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-77 (1974).
88. In addition to the authority discussed in the text, respondents offered sections from the
Manual for Complex Litigation and Rules 16 and 83 of the Fed. R. Civ. P. The Ninth Circuit
rejected the Manual as a source of judicial authority, stating that it is at most a series of
recommendations. See 1 Pt. 2 Moore, supra note 16, at xix. Rule 16, which describes the
discretionary power of the district court to prepare a case for trial by simplifying the issues or
promoting settlement, concludes a list of appropriate pretrial activities with an expansive
reference to "such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action." The Court of
Appeals acknowledged the district court's discretion but concluded that the rule "does not
authorize such notice, at least absent stipulation by the parties." Rule 83 authorizes the
promulgation of rules by a majority of the judges of a particular district. This rule also concludes
with a broad statement that "in all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate
their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules." The Ninth Circuit, however, held
that "a procedure that deviates so sharply from the traditional role of the judiciary cannot be
justified as an ad hoc rule of practice." 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d at 7.
89. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d at 8-9.
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large number would have the effect of transforming "the present action into an
unwieldly pseudo-class-action not authorized by Rule 23.'90
The court addressed the rule 42 argument in a pragmatic fashion. 9 1 Notice to
potential plaintiffs could expedite consolidation of pending actions with
actions yet to be filed. The court, however, insisted that the rule could be
invoked only to consolidate pending actions. 92 It was considered incongruous
to base a power to issue notice to nonparties in a rule involving individuals who
are already parties in pending actions.9 3 The majority concluded that "Rule 42
cannot be used to justify notice in this case simply because these other rules do
not."
9 4
Rule 23 was considered a decisive authority on questions of notice. In its
analysis of this rule, the Ninth Circuit noted that a precertification assumption of
class action status has been made in a limited, although expanding, number of
circumstances. 9" It admitted that precertification notice has been sent under
certain conditions,notably when compromise or dismissal is proposed. 96 How-
ever, the notice intended by the district court was viewed as an attempt to
circumvent rule 23. The majority feared that the district court was planning to
create a "pseudo-class-action," "a mass of joined claims that resembles a class
action but fails to satisfy the requirements of the rule." 97
The Court of Appeals' holding specifically prohibited noticefor the purpose
of inviting claims until an affirmative class action determination had been
made. 98 More generally, it demanded that judicial activity conform to tra-
ditional roles unless change was authorized explicitly by statute or rule.99
The Ninth Circuit referred to the customarily passive operations of the
judiciary, stating that "courts are powerless to act until litigants bring claims
before them."100 It maintained that notice to potential plaintiffs would offend
this principle in two ways: "first, it permits a court to act upon a claim before
it becomes the subject of a lawsuit; and second, it permits a court to acquire
jurisdiction by encouraging lawsuits." 10 However, it was the named plain-
90. Id.
91. The rules were intended to be used in a pragmatic manner. See, e.g., Yaffe v. Powers, 454
F.2d 1362, 1367 (1st Cir. 1972); City of N.Y. v. International Pipe and Ceramics Corp., 410
F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir. 1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
92. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d at 8-9.
93. Id.
94. Id. Judge Schnacke, in his dissent, supported the proposed notice, primarily relying on
the district court's inherent power to manage its own affairs. However, he added that "[ilf
authority of any. . . rule were required, Rule 42(a) and Rule 1 supply it. Rule 42(a) recognizes the
power of the court to make such orders as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay when, as
predictably will occur here, actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before
the court." Id. at 10 (dissenting opinion).
95. See text at notes 15-60 supra.
96. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d at 6 & n.4; see text accompanying notes 38-41 supra.
97. Id. at 7-8.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 7 & n.6.
100. Id. at 5 n.3.
101. Id.
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tiffs who had brought claims before the court and, by filing a class action, it
was they who had made the claims of nonparties the subject of a lawsuit.
Once the action was filed,' 0 2 the district court had a duty to assume an active
role in managing each step in the proceedings. 0 3
Nevertheless, as the majority observed, notice intended to encourage
lawsuits ordinarily has been issued only after the court has determined, at
least tentatively, that the case satisfies rule 23.104 It is submitted, however,
that litigation may be initiated in response to any notice, regardless of its
purpose.105 For example, the district court could have described its plans as
notice of its intention to make a class action determination. The court would
have been within its discretion as defined by the Advisory Committee, '0 6 but
the effect of the notification would have been the same.' 0 7 The Ninth Circuit
asserted that "although an Advisory Committee Note approves of dis-
cretionary notice to potential class members prior to the district court's
determination whether the action should proceed as a class action, the notice
proposed here serves no such limited purpose."' 08 However, the Committee's
Note does not delimit the purposes of the notice it describes. Rather, it states
two stages of an action at which discretionary notice may be issued. Rule
23(d)(2), cited by the Committee, does state purposes for discretionary notice:
"for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair
conduct of the action . ,,.o9 These appear broad enough to include the
district court's aims of economy and efficiency.
The district court is in the best position to know the problems presented by
massive, complex litigation:'1 0 the liability trials covering months, the money
102. Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 provides: "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with
the court."
103. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 481-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See 1 Pt. 2 Moore, supra
note 16, 1.10.
104. See text accompanying notes 17 & 28-32 supra.
105. "It is obvious that any notice which informs an individual of his right of action will stir
up litigation." Ward & Elliott, The Contents and Mechanics of Rule 23 Notice, 10 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 557, 563 (1969). The Advisory Committee warns that section 23(dX2) "[niotice is
available fundamentally 'for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair
conduct of the action' and should not be used merely as a device for the undesirable solicitation of
claims." Advisory Note, supra note 17, at 107. But new claims appear to be an inevitable
by-product of notice, even when it is used to implement fair and efficient procedure. The court can
only formulate the notice in a neutral and objective tone. See note 4 supra.
106. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
107. The same could be said of any discretionary notice. Thus, precertification notice aimed
at preventing frustration or abuse of rule 23 probably would bring more claims before the court,
although certification might ultimately be refused. See notes 53-54 supra and accompanying text.
Similarly, notice informing of a negative class determination would invite response. See notes
56-60 supra and accompanying text.
108. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d at 7. The Advisory Committee Note is quoted in text accompanying
note 55 supra.
109. See note 25 supra.
110. See Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 624, 626-27 (C.D. Cal. 1972). In Gabel, the
court described in detail the problems encountered in airline crash litigation. It noted that while the
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and time wasted as each newly filed action is transferred from another district
and consolidated with the pending actions, and the possibility that persons with
similar losses caused by the same occurrence will be treated differently. Its
attempt to fashion effective procedure should be considered with deference,
because of its understanding of the unique variables involved in each case. I " I
Yet, throughout the opinion, the Ninth Circuit cited no rule or authority
prohibiting notice to potential plaintiffs." 12 Nor did it discuss any substantive
rights which would be injured by such notice. " 13 The majority read the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure narrowly, insisting upon explicit support for any
innovation. This approach to the rules appears inconsistent with their stress on
practical considerations. " 4 In any event, it appears that the district court could
have rephrased its notice plans to bring them within rule 23(d)(2), an explicit
grant of discretionary power.
Eugene Cronin
Civil Procedure-Second Circuit Holds Consolidation Order Appeal-
able Under Collateral Order Doctrine.-On March 8, 1974, the Securities
and Exchange Commission commenced an enforcement action against Republic
National Life Insurance Co., Realty Equities Corp. of New York, and their
auditors, alleging that the defendants participated in a scheme to defraud the
investing public by concealing the true financial condition of Realty Equities. '
Subsequently, seventeen private actions related to the SEC complaint were
brought in the federal courts. 2 On June 12, 1974, twelve of these actions were
ordered consolidated for pretrial purposes under a single consolidated complaint
pursuant to federal rule 42(a).3 In two of these actions, limited claims were made
against defendants Klein, Hinds & Finke and Alexander Grant & Co., 4 even
trial on damages consumes two days or less, "the trial of liability takes from eight to fifteen w eks."
Id. at 626 n. 1.
111. E.g., City of N.Y. v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp.. 410 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir.
1969); see Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.
Rev. 515, 524-26 (1969).
112. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d at 11 (Schnacke, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Advisory Note, supra note 17, at 89, 99.
1. Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., Civil Nos. 74-2053, 74-2054 at 4489 (2d Cir., June 30,
1975) [hereinafter cited as Slip Opinion].
2. Twelve of the actions were filed in the Southern District of New York. Additionally, four
actions were filed in the Northern District of Texas and one in the Middle District of Tennessee.
These five were transferred to the Southern District of New York and consolidated with the other
twelve. Id. at 4489-90.
3. "When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court,
.it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceed-
ings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
4. These parties were named as defendants, but not served, in two other actions. Slip
Opinion at 4491 n.3.
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though these two parties had not been named in the SEC complaint. The latter
two defendants filed a timely appeal of the consolidation order, the appealability
of which was raised sua sponte by the Second Circuit.5 The court held that this
interlocutory order was appealable pursuant to section 1291.6 Katz v. Realty
Equities Corp., Civil Nos. 74-2053, 74-2054 (2d Cir., June 30, 1975).
Established at common law, 7 the final judgment rule has long governed
federal appellate review.8 Under this rule, immediate review of interlocutory
orders is usually denied on the ground that it may be had without prejudice
on appeal of a final judgment on the merits.9 The justification for this
restriction is that it prevents the appellants and the courts from experiencing
the unwarranted cost and delay, which are believed to result from "piecemeal
disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single controversy
"10
The final judgment rule has been difficult to apply, since no one definition
of a final decision will be adequate in all situations. " As a result, the Supreme
Court has taken "a practical rather than technical" approach to the question
of finality. 12 Such an interpretation of the finality requirement of section 1291
resulted in the creation of the "collateral order" doctrine defined in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 13 In Cohen, the district court held that a
statute requiring minority shareholders to post a security bond in shareholders'
derivative suits was inapplicable to suits in federal court. 14 The Third Circuit
accepted jurisdiction of the appeal and reversed.' 5 In affirming the juris-
dictional ruling, the Supreme Court defined appealable collateral orders as
those decisions that
fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and
collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
5. Id. at 4493.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
7. Crick, "The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal," 41 Yale L.J. 539, 541-44 (1932),
discussing John de Ralegh's Case, Y.B. 17 Ed. 3 (R.S.) 234 (1343).
8. Federal Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chs. 20, 21, 22, 25, 1 Stat. 83-87. See 28 U.SC.
§ 1291: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions . except
when direct appeal to the Supreme Court is provided.
9. E.g., Bowles v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 107 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1939).
10. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).
11. E.g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964); Dickinson v.
Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950); McGourkey v. Toledo & 0. Cent. Ry.,
146 U.S. 536, 544-45 (1892). A general statement is that a final judgment or decision "is one
which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the courts to do but execute the
judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); accord, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
12. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
13. Id. at 545-47. See, e.g., MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1958);
"Developments in the Law-Discovery," 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 999-1000 (1961).
14. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 7 F.R.D. 352 (D.N.J. 1947), rev'd, 170 F.2d 44 (3d
Cir. 1948), aff'd, 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
15. 170 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1948), aff'd, 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until
the whole case is adjudicated. 16
Since such an order "does not require consideration" with the cause of
action, 17 the interlocutory decision is appealable if it also "presents a serious
and unsettled question," not merely a review of the exercise of discretion by
the trial judge. 18 However, the Court did not require a "serious and unsettled
question" if the appeal might effectively terminate the whole action. t 9 Review
of a consolidation order would not have this result.
Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, S.A.,7 0 decid-
ed the year after Cohen, demonstrated an application of the Cohen rule.
In Swift, the district court vacated an attachment of a vessel while
maintaining jurisdiction over the parties with respect to a claim of gar-
nishment of other property. 2' In upholding the jurisdiction of the court of
appeals,22 the Supreme Court stated that the order came
squarely within the considerations of [Cohen]. Appellate review of the order dissolving the
attachment at a later date would be an empty rite after the vessel had been released and
the restoration of the attachment only theoretically possible.2 3
The appealability of a consolidation order for pretrial purposes was first
examined in MacAlister v. GuternZa.2 4 The Second Circuit held that, under
the Cohen rule, the trial court's refusal to consolidate was appealable. s The
court emphasized two reasons for accepting the appeal. First, such an order
had never been subject to appellate review.2 6 Second, relief from the op-
16. 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
17. Id. at 547.
18. Id. The Cohen rule requires three characteristics of an order for it to be appealable as a
"final decision" under section 1291: "(1) the order must be a final determination of a claim of right
'separable from, and collateral to,' rights asserted in the action; (2) it must be 'too important to be
denied review,' in the sense that it 'presents a serious and unsettled question'; and (3) its review
cannot, in the nature of the question that it presents, await final judgment because 'when that
time comes, it will be too late effectively to review the... order and rights conferred. . . %ill
have been lost, probably irreparably.' " 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice I 110.10, at 133 (2d ed. 1975)
(footnote omitted). The second requirement was dictum, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949), but has been established as a necessary limiting element of the rule.
See, e.g., Mac!lister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 67 (1958).
19. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (refusal to reduce bail) now generally reviewable under
18 U.S.C. § 3147 (1970); Roberts v. United States Dist. CL, 339 U.S. 844 (1950) (refusal to
permit plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis).
20. 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
21. Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Transmaritima Colombiana S.A., 83 F. Supp. 273
(D.C.Z.), rev'd sub nom., Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, S.A., 175
F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
22. 175 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
23. 339 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1950).
24. 263 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1958).
25. Id. at 66-67.
26. Id. at 67. The court specifically stated that it did "not attempt here to prescribe a rule of
universal application to orders granting or denying consolidation." Id.
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pressive duplication and confusion feared by appellant might have been
unavailable if review had been postponed until final judgment 2"
At the time MacAlister was decided, legislation providing for appeal of
interlocutory orders was limited to five narrowly defined areas, involving
injunctions, receivers, admiralty, patent infringement, 28 and bankruptcy.29 In
1958, section 1292 was amended to permit a wider discretionary appeal of
interlocutory orders. 30 The new section 1292(b) provided for appeal of an
otherwise unappealable order if the district judge in his discretion certifies
that
such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. .... 3.
The court of appeals, on the basis of such certification, may accept or reject
the appeal. The bases for permitting review under this statute are very similar
to those under the collateral order doctrine. 3 2
27. Id.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(aX4) (1970).
29. 11 U.S.C. §§ 47, 48 (1970). In exceptional circumstances an interlocutory order may have
been reviewed through the use of an extraordinary writ, especially a writ of mandamus, 28
U.S.C. § 1651 (1970), although a writ of mandamus "may not be used to thwart the congressional
policy against piecemeal appeals." Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1956); see, e.g.,
Nelson v. Grooms, 307 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1962) (petition for mandamus reviewed although writ,
seeking interlocutory order, denied); American Pac. Dairy Prods., Inc. v. District Ct. of Guam,
217 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1955) (petition reviewed but mandamus will not issue in the absence of
affirmative showing of prejudice resulting from consolidation). But see Regec v. Thornton, 275
F.2d 801 (6th Cir. 1960) (mandamus proceeding cannot be used to test correctness of district
judge's interlocutory order).
30. The purpose of the amendment was to expedite cases pending before the district courts. S.
Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4 (1958).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
32. See, e.g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 154 (1964). In applying
either the collateral order doctrine or section 1292(b) to consolidation orders, the same problem Is
encountered. The requirement of a "serious and unsettled question" for the Cohen rule or "a
controlling question of law" under section 1292(b) is difficult to define in relation to the review of
discretionary action by the trial judge. Although both Wright and Moore agree that discretionary
appeals pursuant to section 1292(b) are desirable, they draw different conclusions as to whether
interlocutory orders should be reviewed through section 1291 as collateral orders or through
section 1292(b). Professor Wright once felt that the "well settled" collateral order rule should take
precedence over section 1292(b). Wright, "The Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958," 23 F.R.D.
199, 203 (1959). However, his view has changed. See note 49 infra. Moore contends that, because
appeal of such a discretionary matter is time consuming, the unusual consolidation order should
be reviewed under section 1292(b), not the Cohen doctrine, 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice 110.13
(2d ed. 1975). Discretionary appeal is viewed as much more efficient than appeal under the
collateral order doctrine. Presumably, the requirement of trial court certification eliminates a
large number of baseless appeals which the appellate court must otherwise waste its time
evaluating. This factor is evidently more significant than the aim of permitting interlocutory
appeals in order to facilitate early termination of the action. Thus, the judicial exceptions to
finality may be labor saving devices which cause more labor than they save. Sunderland, "The
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When both may be applied, however, appeal pursuant to section 1292(b) is
distinctly preferable. 33 Appeals taken under the Cohen rule pursuant to
section 1291 are much less efficient than those brought pursuant to section
1292(b). Considerable time is wasted in taking the appeal and then in
determining whether the order satisfies the rule. 34 Since the discretionary
aspect of section 1292(b) provides a more efficient screening of appeals both at
the trial level and in the court of appeals, it is logically preferable to the Cohen
rule.
As a result of the inefficiency of the Cohen rule, its use has been limited.
The Second Circuit has restricted its applicability to cases which "will settle
the matter not simply for the case in hand but for many others. ' 36 The
limitation has also been interpreted to require that a case present "exceptional
circumstances" or raise "basic issues."' 37 However, the policy aimed at limiting
Cohen was not followed in Garber v. Randell,38 a Second Circuit decision in
which an order consolidating three shareholder class and derivative actions
allegedly prejudiced one party.39 In deciding that the order was appealable
under the collateral order doctrine, the court interpretedMacAlister to permit an
appeal of any consolidation order which denied
a party his due process right to prosecute his own separate and distinct claims or
defenses without having them so merged into the claims or defenses of others that
irreparable injury will result 40
Problem of Appellate Review," 5 Texas L. Rev. 126, 127 (1926). Wright, "The Interlocutory
Appeals Act of 1958," 23 F.R.D. 199 (1959).
33. See note 32 supra.
34. By contrast, an appeal pursuant to section 1292(b) must be filed with the court of appeals
within ten days after the trial judge has certified the appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 5(a). The court of
appeals can deny the application for appeal for any reason; e.g., a controlling question is not
involved, or delay would be excessive because the court docket is overloaded. S. Rep. No. 2434,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
35. See note 32 supra.
36. Donlon Indus., Inc. v. Forte, 402 F.2d 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Garber v.
Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 716 (2d Cir. 1973); Levine v. American Export Indus., Inc., 473 F.2d
1008, 1009 (2d Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Vatchers Int'l, Inc., 455
F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972) (policy considerations for the application of the Cohen rule involve
an analysis of whether the appeal will settle the point once and for all or open the floodgates for
appeals on various fact situations).
37. Using this language, appeal of an order consolidating, for pretrial purposes, class and
derivative shareholders' actions was denied. Levine v. American Export Indus., Inc., 473 F.2d
1008, 1009 (2d Cir. 1973) (per curian). Judge Friendly, in his concurring opinion in Katz,
disapproved of the vagueness of this language. Slip Opinion at 4S05.
38. 477 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1973).
39. Id. at 716. White & Case was one of some fifty-eight defendants in an action consolidating
three shareholder class and derivative suits for pretrial purposes. White & Case claimed that
denial of its motion for severance would irreparably prejudice the firm due to the confusion and
delay to which it would unnecessarily be subjected. White & Case asserted that the limited claims
against it did not justify its consolidation in the complex action. Id. at 712-13, 717.
40. Id. at 716. The irreparable injury feared here appears to be the cost and delay of trial.
This was sufficient basis for accepting jurisdiction in a "marginal" case. Gillespie v. United States
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Ignoring the "serious and unsettled question" element of the Cohen rule, the
court in Garber relied on the "carefully considered opinions of this court in the
very area now before us, consolidation of stockholders' derivative and class
suits."'4 1 Thus, the court used the collateral order doctrine to review a
question of fact rather than to resolve an unsettled question of law. Such
review, it is submitted, violated the policy of limiting the Cohen rule. 42
Only one other circuit has ever permitted appeal of an order granting or
denying consolidation as a final decision. In two pre-Cohen cases,43 the Eighth
Circuit permitted the appeal of consolidation orders which extended re-
ceiverships or effected interventions on the ground that irreparable harm
might have resulted. 44
Since these decisions, several other circuits have confronted the.issue of the
appealability of a grant or denial of consolidation and, except for the Second
Circuit, appeal of such orders as final decisions has been uniformly denied.
Prior to Cohen, the Tenth Circuit refused to allow the appeal of an order
consolidating actions against three related corporations under one receiver
since no statute specifically provided for such appeal. 45 After Cohen was
decided and section 1292(b) was enacted in 1958, orders denying consolidation
of separate pending actions have been held non-appealable under the Cohen
rule by the Third and Fifth Circuits. 46 In contrast, an order consolidating an
Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 154 (1964). But see, e.g., Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371
U.S. 555, 574 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting): "To rely on the hardship of being subjected to trial [in
allowing appeal] is to do away with the distinction between interlocutory and final orders."
41. 477 F.2d at 715. See also State Mut. Life Assurance Co. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 49 F.R.D. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1969): "It is settled law in this circuit that Rule 42(a) empowers the
district court to order consolidation for pre-trial purposes." Id. at 207, citing MacAlister v. Guterma,
263 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1958). The same point is made in Feldman v, Hanley, 49 F.R.D. 48, 50
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); see Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 717 n.4 (2d Cir. 1958). But see MacAlster v.
Guterma, supra, at 69, which stated that the district court does not have this authority.
42. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). See text accompanying note
18 supra.
43. Adler v. Seaman, 266 F. 828 (8th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 655 (1921); Bankers'
Trust Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 251 F. 789 (8th Cir. 1918).
44. 266 F. at 840-41; 251 F. at 796-97. The Second Circuit approved of this reasoning in another
early case, Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 61 F.2d 934, 940 (2d Cir. 1932), aff'd, 289 U.S. 479
(1933). The court of appeals in Johnson stated that relief from irreparable harm due to other
effects of consolidation would require the use of extraordinary writs. Id.
45. Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1944). The Tenth Circuit took a restricted
approach in refusing to permit the appeal of such an order. No mention was made of the
pragmatic approach to finality. Instead, after permitting appeal on other grounds, the court stated
that because no statute permitted appeal of a consolidation order, such an order was not appealable.
Id. at 671.
46. In 1963, in Nolfi v. Chrysler Corp., 324 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1963) (per curiam), the Third
Circuit became the first court after the passage of section 1292(b) to address the question of the
appealability of such an order. With little explanation, the court held that an order denying
consolidation of two civil actions arising out of the same automobile accident was not appealable
under either the Cohen rule or section 1292. However, the court confined its holding to the
appealability of the order in issue. The court indicated that MacAlister v. Guterma should be
compared with Nolfi, thus implying that MacAlister was distinguishable from Nolfi. Id. at 374.
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action for damages requiring a jury with an indemnity action not requiring a
jury,47 and an order consolidating airplane death actions solely on the issue of
liability4" have been successfully appealed pursuant to section 1292(b). 49
Thus, the Second Circuit approach permitting appeal of consolidation
orders under the Cohen rule has not been followed in the other circuits.
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit by permitting appeal of a consolidation order
in Katz, reiterated its position on this issue.5 0 With little discussion, the court
attempted to remedy the omission made in Garber by including the "serious
Five years later, in United States v. Chelsea Towers, Inc., 404 F.2d 329 (3rd Cir. 1968) (per
curiam), the same circuit again refused to permit the appeal of an order denying consolidation of
pending actions. The scope of this opinion, however, was more limited than Nolfi, since reference
to section 1292(b) was absent. Also, appeal through the collateral order doctrine was denied
because the court saw no "drastic or irreparable effect upon some significant right of a party....
in a judicial refusal to consolidate separate pending actions." Id. at 330. Clearly, Chelsea Towers
left undecided whether a consolidation order might be appealed under section 1292(b) and also
whether any consolidation orders might satisfy the Cohen rule.
More recently, the Fifth Circuit, in NAACP v. Michot, 480 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam), refused to expand the Cohen doctrine to include any denial of consolidation. After the
district court had denied a motion to consolidate one case with another previously filed in that
court, the court of appeals refused to permit an appeal from this order, stating categorically that
"[alan order denying consolidation is not a final appealable order." Id.
In 1960, an analogous order granting separate trials was held by the Sixth Circuit to be
non-appealable because it did not involve an "extraordinary situation." Travellers Indem. Co.
v. Miller M.fg. Co., 276 F.2d 955, 956 (6th Cir. 1960) (per curiam). What the court meant by this
wording is unclear. No mention of the Cohen rule was made or that the circuit had previously
rejected the use of mandamus to review such an order. Regec v. Thornton, 275 F.2d 801 (6th Cir.
1960) (per curiam). See note 32 supra.
47. Blake v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 417 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1969) (the section 1292(b) certificate is
found in Close v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 44 F.R.D. 398, 411-12 (1968)).
48. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924
(1961). An analogous order severing six claims and transferring them while retaining jurisdiction
over another two was held appealable under this section by the Second Circuit. Wyndham Associates
v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968).
49. There have been few such appeals because the courts have been careful to conform to the
legislative intent that the trial judge exercise his discretion sparingly. S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). It is clear, however, that courts have shown a preference for appeal
pursuant to section 1292(b) rather than the Cohen rule. Several courts have used the conclusions
reached by the treatises, J. Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1975); C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure (1971), as authority for this decision. E.g., Slip Opinion at 4504-06
(Friendly, J., concurring) (Moore and Wright & Miller); NAACP v. Michot, 480 F.2d 547, 548
(5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (Wright & Miller); Nolfi v. Chrysler Corp., 324 F.2d 373, 374 (3d Cir.
1963) (per curiam) (Moore). Moore asserts that orders granting or denying consolidation are
ordinary interlocutory orders which should only be appealed under section 1292(b). 9 J. Moore,
Federal Practice 110.13 [8], at 184 (2d ed. 1975). Wright & Miller would permit appeal of such
orders under the Cohen doctrine "rarely, if at all." It would also permit appeal pursuant to
section 1292(b). 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2386, at 275-76
(1971). An important reason for refusing immediate appeal is that relief from a prejudicial order
can be had on appeal from final judgment in the case. See note 53 infra.
50. Slip Opinion at 4493.
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and unsettled question" 5' element. However, the validity of Garber could not
be so easily established since it relied on MacAlister, a case of doubtful
validity itself. Two developments have seriously undermined the jurisdic-
tional holding of MacAlister. First, the need for review under the Cohen rule
was considerably lessened by the passage of section 1292(b).5 2 Second,
successful review of consolidation orders after final judgment on the merits,
not generally permitted until after MacAlister, has made immediate review
unnecessary.5 3
Disregarding these factors, the Second Circuit justified a temporary ex-
tension of Cohen because it found a possible violation of the appellants' due
process rights,5 4 as well as judicial inexperience with "complex and mul-
tifaceted actions.""5 The appeal in Katz did not involve a "serious and
unsettled question" requiring immediate appellate review. In fact, the au-
thority of a district court to order pretrial consolidation under a consolidated
complaint has been well established.5 6
In his concurring opinion, Judge Friendly strongly disagreed, asserting for
several reasons that the order should not have been appealable under the
Cohen rule.5 7 First, it did not have the elements of an appealable collateral
order, since the order could be effectively reviewed from a final judgment on
the merits.5 8 The court's decision on this point, furthermore, did not settle
questions of law beyond the scope of the case, but rather opened the way for
appeals concerning the exercise of ordinary discretion by the trial judge.5 9
Judge Friendly did recognize that review might be granted in some cases for
abuse of discretion but noted that this provision would cause great trouble
while providing negligible benefit. 60 Thus, he reasoned that review at this
point would only cause delay, one of the evils sought to be remedied. 6'
51. Id., quoting MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1958).
52. See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
53. Dupont v. Southern Pac. Co., 366 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
958 (1967); Atkinson v. Roth, 297 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1961). These were personal injury cases
where the plaintiff in one action was the defendant in another of the consolidated actions. This
prejudice was remedied on appeal from final judgment.
54. Slip Opinion at 4493, quoting Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 716 (2d Cir. 1973).
55. Id. at 4494. The court hoped that the Cohen rule would soon be limited again "and the
salutary policies behind the finality rule be reasserted." Id.
56. See note 41 supra.
57. Slip Opinion at 4503-04 (concurring opinion).
58. Id. at 4504, citing Dupont v. Southern Pac. Co., 366 F.2d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 958 (1967); Atkinson v. Roth, 297 F.2d 570, 575 (3d Cir. 1961); 9 C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2386, at 276 (1971). See text accompanying
note 53 supra.
59. Slip Opinion at 4504. "[J]udicial precedent is legion which suggests that the likelihood of
successfully urging an abuse of discretion in a appellate court is comparable to the chance which an
ice cube would have of retaining its obese proportions while floating in a pot of boiling water."
Seven-Up Co. v. O-So Grape Co., 179 F. Supp. 167, 172 (S.D. 1ll. 1959).
60. Slip Opinion at 4506.
61. Id. The court filed two consolidation orders, one on June 24, 1974 and one on August 26,
1974. Id. at 4490. From these orders the appeal was taken and decided on June 30, 1975, a
[Vol. 44
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Secondly, Judge Friendly asserted that the policy against expanding the
Cohen rule and appellate jurisdiction was very important in view of the
crowded appellate dockets. 62 Finally, he implied that MacAlister was obso-
lete in that it was decided at a time when the finality rule was much more
harsh in its effect than it is at the present time.
63
The basic disagreement between the majority in Katz and Judge Friendly
concerned the role of the appellate court. The majority preferred to attempt to
do justice in this particular case even if that involved interfering with the trial
judge.64 As a result, the court merely reviewed a question of fact which could
have been reviewed on appeal from final judgment. 65 The question for review
was whether pretrial confusion would cause irreparable injury. To allow such
a question comes dangerously close to permitting appeal on the basis of the
hardships of litigation. To permit such an approach would eliminate al-
together the distinction between interlocutory and final orders. 6
6
In contrast, the position of Judge Friendly advocates that the appellate court
limit itself to reviewing the law; in this case whether the trial court correctly
exercised its power to order consolidation. 67 Its rationale is that leaving the
decision on the appealability of an order to the sound judgment of the trial
judge pursuant to section 1292(b) reduces delay to both the litigants and the
courts.68 Abuse of such discretion could still be reviewed by the writ of
mandamus.69
considerable delay. Judge Friendly saw this delay as a significant factor in deciding whether to
accept the appeal. Id. at 4505-06.
62. Id. Although delay due to congested dockets is obviously a serious problem there is debate
as to whether restricting appeals such as this one under the collateral order doctrine is a solution.
See, e.g., Wright, "The Overloaded Fifth Circuit A Crisis in Judicial Administration," 42 Texas
L. Rev. 949, 977 (1964). Seeing the burden on the appellate courts as critical, Professor Wright
suggests, inter alia, refusal of interlocutory appeals and reviews of questions of fact. Moore
cautions that extension of the collateral order doctrine "to this area is to invite frustration and
delay." 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice 110.1318], at 184 (2d ed. 1975). But see, e.g., Carrington,
Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the
National Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 542, 568 (1969), wherein one commentator claims that this
relaxation of the finality rule and the corresponding growth of appellate review is healthy and the
strain on the appellate dockets is not critical.
63. Slip Opinion at 4506.
64. This type of review is not without precedent. It is analogous to [.aBuy v. Howes Leather
Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). There the court of appeals, by means of mandamus, upheld review of
the trial judge's discretion in allowing reference to a master pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
The supervisory type of mandamus developed in Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964),
and Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967). Schlagenhauf v. Holder permitted the court to
review a "basic, undecided question" and "to settle new and important problems." 379 U.S. at
110-11. Since this requirement is very similar to the "serious and unsettled question" limitation of
Cohen, supervisory mandamus performs the same function as the Cohen rule. See 9 1. Moore,
Federal Practice 110. 10, at 136 (2d ed. 1973). "It may be used... to promote economical, even,
and orderly administration of justice within the circuit." Id. 110.28 at 312.
65. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
66. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
67. Slip Opinion at 4505-06.
68. See note 32 supra.
69. See notes 29 and 64 supra.
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The position of Judge Friendly, representing the majority of the circuits which
have spoken on the question, seems by far the preferable one. The use of section
12 92(b) and mandamus would increase the efficiency of the appellate court since
these petitions can be summarily dismissed and at minimal inconvenience to the
parties. Therefore, there is no need to extend the disfavored Cohen rule to
include order granting or denying consolidation. Such a practice is inefficient
and unnecessary. It is hoped that the Second Circuit, given another opportunity
to examine the issue, will see the merit of the majority position, and will join the
other circuits in repudiating the approach that it has taken since MacAlister was
decided.
Payson Fitts
Constitutional Law-Establishment Clause-Sixth Circuit Questions
Validity of the Reasonable Accommodation Rule.-One of the provisions
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 which has received minimal scrutiny
by the courts is the prohibition against religious discrimination in employ-
ment. In its original form, 2 this prohibition was unclear because the term
"religion" was nowhere defined in the statute, 3 nor was the term "discrimi-
nation. ' '4 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was
empowered by Congress to review religious discrimination cases, 5 issue
right-to-sue letters6 and promulgate regulations for the guidance of employ-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c et seq. (1970).
2. The original provisions of Title VII dealing with religious discrimination in employment
which are still in effect, provide in pertinent part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer--() to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." Id. § 2000e-2 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2 (1970).
"No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual . . . if such
individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or
advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on
account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ...." Id. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. I, 1972).
3. See Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration Under Title
VII, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 599, 614-19 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Edwards & Kaplan).
4. Id. at 619-37.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (Supp. II, 1972).
6. The provision regarding these letters provides: "If a charge filed with the Commission
pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, is dismissed by the Commission, or if within one
hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference
under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil
action under this section ... or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to
which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission . . . shall so notify the person aggrieved
and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the
respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge
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ers.7 In 1966, the EEOC issued its initial guidelines on the subject, which
provided that employers were permitted to establish uniform work schedules
for employees and that "absent an intent on the part of the employer to
discriminate on religious grounds," an employer was not required to ac-
commodate the religious needs of his employees, nor was an employee "entitled
to demand any alterations [in the work schedule] to accommodate his religious
needs."'8 A year later, however, the EEOC set forth a new guideline,
regulation 1605.1, 9 which evidenced a reversal of its thinking on the subject
in recognizing an "obligation on the part of the employer"'0 to accommodate
his employees' religious needs unless such accommodation could not be made
"without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.", It
Congress soon followed suit, and in 1972, amended Title VII to include this
reasonable accommodation rule in the statute itself.' 2
The present discussion will trace the Sixth Circuit's treatment of the
was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved
by the alleged unlawful employment practice." Id. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (Supp. 11, 1972), amending 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-S(e) (1970). See Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416, 424 (6th Cir.
1974).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1970).
8. Reid v. Memphis Pubi. Co., No. 74-1761 (6th Cir., Aug. 20, 1975), at 12.
9. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1974), effective
July 13, 1967:
"Observation of the Sabbath and other religious holidays.
(a) Several complaints filed with the Commission have raised the question whether it is
discrimination on account of religion to discharge or refuse to hire employees who regularly
observe Friday evening and Saturday, or some other day of the week, as the Sabbath or who
observe certain special religious holidays during the year and, as a consequence, do not work on
such days.
(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds, required by
section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes an obligation on the part of the
employer to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees and prospective
employees where such accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of
the employer's business. Such undue hardship, for example, may exist where the employee's
needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially similar qualifications
during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer.
(c) Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to hire an employee or
applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer has the burden of proving that an
undue hardship renders the required accommodations to the religious needs of the employee
unreasonable.
(d) The Commission will review each case on an individual basis in an effort to seek an
equitable application of these guidelines to the variety of situations which arise due to the varied
religious practices of the American people."
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. The 1972 amendment provides in pertinent part "6i) The term 'religion' indudes all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable
to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)
(Supp. II, 1972).
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religious discrimination provisions of Title VII in light of its two recent
contradictory decisions. 13
In a pre-1972 amendment case, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 14 plaintiff,
a member of the Faith Reformed Church which forbade work on Saturday,
was permitted by his employer to obtain replacements for his Saturday work.
Later, Dewey refused to find replacements, claiming that this was a sin, and
as a result was discharged by his employer. In Dewey's suit against his
employer for wrongful discharge, the district court applied the 1967 version of
regulation 1605.1 retroactively, even though it did not become effective until
ten months after Dewey's discharge. 15 The district court found that defendant
had not accommodated Dewey's religious needs. 16 The Sixth Circuit reversed,
finding that it was improper to apply the new, more stringent guideline and
that, even if it were applied, defendant had met its accommodation re-
quirement. 1 7
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Dewey raised the problem of clarification of
the term "discrimination" as used in Title VII and the regulation. IS Three
possible definitions of discrimination could be applied in Title VII religious
discrimination cases: discrimination by intent ("prohibit[ing] only intentional
and willful acts of discrimination"), 19 the EEOC discrimination by effect
("which allow[s] for exculpation (1) if the employer has made an effort
reasonably to accommodate the religious needs of the employee, or (2) if an
accommodation cannot be made without undue hardship to the employer"), 20 or
pure discrimination by effect ("prohibiting an employer action or rule that is
otherwise neutral on its face"). 21
The Sixth Circuit in Dewey clearly adopted the narrowest definition of
13. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) (No. 478); Reid v. Memphis Publ. Co., No. 74-1761 (6th Cir.,
Aug. 20, 1975).
14. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
15. Id. at 329.
16. 300 F. Supp. 709, 714 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd, 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
17. 429 F.2d at 330-32.
18. Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 3, at 619-37. The article noted that the term "religion" also
needed clarification. Id. at 614-19. Citing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), for the
proposition that the Supreme Court had construed the "theistic requirement" out of the word
"religion," id. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring), the authors continued: "In sum, the necessarily
broad definition of religion has a serious impact on the sweep and possible effect of asserted title
VII rights. In defining the scope of those rights, this expansive and malleable definition of religion
cannot be ignored. Indeed, it serves to buttress the argument . . . that the definition of
'discrimination' under title VII should be narrow and encompass only intentional discrimination,
rather than be the broader one of reasonable accommodation or the still broader one of
discrimination by effect." Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 3, at 619. For a discussion of the effect
of the broad definition of religion and its effect on Title VII determinations, see text accompany-
ing notes 49-53 infra.
19. Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 3, at 619.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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discrimination-discrimination by intent 2 However, the court quickly
abandoned the intent standard in Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co. (Reid 1).23
After plaintiff Reid had been offered employment as a newspaper copyreader,
his prospective employer became aware that, as a Seventh Day Adventist,
Reid was unable to work on Saturdays. For this reason the newspaper refused
to hire him and Reid commenced an action for religious discrimination. The
district court, relying on Dewey, entered judgment for the defendant-
newspaper and concluded that " 'the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
prove that he was not hired because of discrimination based upon race or
religion.' "24 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, distinguishing the Dewey
case on a number of grounds. First, the court explained that in Dewey the
employer had made a reasonable accommodation by permitting Dewey to
arrange for replacements, while the defendant in Reid I had made no similar
efforts. 25 Second, the 1967 EEOC guideline,2 6 about which the court had
expressed serious doubts in Dewey,2 7 was effective and controlling in Reid 1.28
More notably, however, the court abandoned the discrimination by intent
standard, stating:
The question then is not whether the [defendant's] rules were intentionally dis-
criminatory as to religion, but rather whether the [defendant] could make "reasonable
accommodation" to the religious practices of appellant Reid "without undue hard-
ship."29
22. "In Dewey, the Sixth Circuit on rehearing unmistakably limited title VII's proscription to
the intentional religious-discrimination standard. Although the court toyed with the reasonable-
accommodation theory in its first opinion, only to conclude, contrary to the district court, that
Reynolds had made such an accommodation, its second decision rejects any such requirement.
The district court, on the other hand, adopted both the EEOC standard of accommodation and,
by badly straining Sherbert v. Verner, [374 U.S. 398 (1963)] the discrimination-by-effect stan-
dard." Id. at 619-20 (footnotes omitted).
23. 468 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1972), remanded, 369 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Tenn. 1973). aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, No. 74-1761 (6th Cir., Aug. 20, 1975).
24. Id. at 348.
25. Id. at 349.
26. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
27. 429 F.2d at 331 n.1.
28. 468 F.2d at 349-50. In upholding the validity of the EEOC guideline, the court relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Although the
Griggs case involved racial discrimination in employment, the Reid court found that its reasoning
could be extended to other forms of discrimination: " 'The Act proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.' "468 F.2d at 350,
quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The court also distinguished Dewey
on the ground that in Dewey an arbitration award in favor of the employer was binding, while no
arbitration factor existed in Reid I. 468 F.2d at 349.
The Supreme Court recently disagreed as to the effect of an arbitrator's award on a subsequent
Title VII action in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). For a discussion of the
role of arbitration in Title VII religious discrimination cases, see Wolkinson, Title VII and the
Religious Employee: The Neglected Duty of Accommodation, 30 Arb. J. (n.s.) 89 (1975).
29. 468 F.2d at 351.
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The court in Reid I seemed to adopt the new EEOC discrimination by
effect standard. 30 However, they left it relatively undefined, remanding to the
district court with little guidance. 31 It was left to the court in Cummins v.
Parker Seal Co. 32 to define this new standard.
After twelve years as an employee of Parker Seal Company (Parker Seal),
plaintiff Cummins joined the World Wide Church of God, which forbids
work from Friday sundown through Saturday sundown. Complaints from
co-workers regarding his subsequent dispensation from Saturday work caused
Cummins' discharge. Plaintiff secured a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC
and brought an action against Parker Seal for religious discrimination. The
district court found that defendant " 'made a reasonable accommodation to
[appellant's] religious needs . . . . 33 and entered judgment for Parker Seal.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, upholding Cummins' discrimination
claim and further finding that Title VII's reasonable accommodation rule was
not an unconstitutional violation of the establishment clause. 34
Two major issues were presented in Cummins:35 the standards an employer
must meet to satisfy the requirements of Title VII's reasonable accommoda-
tion rule and the constitutionality of the rule itself. 3 6 The court first turned to
the validity of regulation 1605.1. Citing Reid I, the court upheld the regu-
lation, 37 and further declared that even though the 1972 amendment to Title
VIPs-the Congressional codification of regulation 1605.1-had not been in
effect at the time of Cummins' discharge, that "for purposes of this case there
is no difference between the Regulation and the amendment." 39
30. See Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 3, at 619. See also text accompanying notes 18-21
supra.
31. 468 F.2d at 351. The district court on remand had little difficulty finding that the
employer had not made a reasonable accommodation to Reid's religious needs in view of the fact
that defendant simply refused to hire him. Reid v. Memphis Publ. Co., 369 F. Supp. 684, 689
(W.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, No. 74-1761 (6th Cir., Aug. 20, 1975).
32. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975)
(No. 478).
33. Id. at 547.
34. U.S. Const. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
35. Prior to the plaintiff's action in the district court, his religious discrimination charge was
dismissed by the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights. 516 F.2d at 545. On this basis, defendant
raised the defense of resjudicata citing Batiste v. FurncoConstr. Corp., 350 F. Supp. 10(N.D. Ill.
1972). This issue will not be dealt with in the present discussion due to the fact that defendant
"abandoned this defense in view of Batiste's reversal by the Seventh Circuit, Batiste v. Furnco
Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447(7th Cir. 1974), [cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975)]." 516 F.2d at 546.
36. The Fifth Circuit has also examined the reasonable accommodation rule. See Young v.
Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. United States Postal
Serv., 497 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir.
1972).
37. 516 F.2d at 547.
38. See note 12 supra.
39. 516 F.2d at 547; see note 9 supra. Although the Reid I court had discussed section 2000ej)
(Supp. II, 1972) as one reason for its holding, it accepted the statute's definition at face value and did
not offer its own interpretation. Reid v. Memphis Publ. Co., 468 F.2d 346, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1972),
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Seemingly, plaintiff Cummins had a much weaker case than did Reid. 40
However, the Sixth Circuit took this opportunity to lay down demanding
standards for employers. The court found that
the major reason for [Cummins'] discharge was, in the words of [the general manager of
plaintiffs division] the "considerable consternation and problems with the rest of our
employees who were being required to work a full shift." In short, [Cummins'] fellow
supervisors resented having to work on Saturdays while [Cummins] was not forced to
do so.
4 1
The court disagreed with defendants contention that complaints and
grumblings were sufficient cause for discharge. "If employees are disgruntled
because an employer accommodates its work rules to the religious needs of
one employee, under EEOC Regulation 1605 and § 2000e(j) such grumbling
must yield to the single employee's right to practice his religion.1 42
According to the court in Cummins, in order to satisfy the requisites of
regulation 1605 and section 2000e(j), the employer must pursue a more active
course of accommodation. 43 Not only must an employer take pains to provide
for substitutes, but the court went on to suggest that not until an "un-
reasonable strain" is placed on his business will an employer be permitted to
discharge an employee for refusing to work on his or her Sabbath. 4 4
The relatively strong language of the court in defining the standard
represents a continuation of the progression begun in Dewey from discrimi-
nation by intent to pure discrimination by effect. While it is not suggested that
the Cummins court reached the "pure effect" end of the spectrum, the
demands which are made of employers under this test certainly limit the scope
of permissible conduct.
The second issue presented to the court was whether the EEOC regulation
and section 2000e(j) were "laws 'respecting an establishment of religion' and
therefore invalid under the first amendment. 4S Over a strong dissent, the
remanded, 369 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, No. 74-1761 (6th Cir.,
Aug. 20, 1975).
40. In Reid's case, no accommodation had been made, whereas the employer in Cummins'
case had attempted to deal with the plaintiff's problem for over a year before firing him. Reid
informed his prospective employer before he was hired that his religion forbade Saturday work.
Cummins had not joined the World Wide Church of God until approximately 12 years after
joining Parker Seal.
41. 516 F.2d at 550.
42. Id.
43. Id. "For example, [the employer's] officials could have required Appellant [Cummins) to
work longer hours on week days or on Sundays.... They could have taken pains to ensure that
Appellant substituted for his colleagues on an equitable basis, rather than assuming that the
co-workers would make appropriate demands upon Appellant." Id.
44. Id. at 551.
45. Id. The history of the establishment clause may be chronologically traced through the
following significant decisions: Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Illinois e-x rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948);
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) [see text accompanying note 47 infral; see B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law 274-79 (1972). For
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majority upheld the constitutionality of the reasonable accommodation rule. 46
In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,47 the Supreme Court
outlined the three requirements that must be met in order to withstand an
alleged violation of the establishment clause:
[T]o pass muster under the Establishment Clause the law in question, first, must
reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose, . . . second, must have a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, . .. and, third, must avoid excessive
government entanglement with religion .... 48
The Sixth Circuit applied each part of the test to the reasonable ac-
commodation rule. First, the majority found that the reasonable accommo-
dation rule reflected a secular legislative purpose. 4 9 Reasoning that the rule
was "intended to prevent discrimination in employment" and "designed to put
teeth in the existing prohibition of religious discrimination," 50 the court
applied the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gillette v. United States5' and
concluded that
(]ike the conscientious objector exemption, the reasonable accommodation rule reflects
a legislative judgment that, as a practical matter, certain persons will not compromise
their religious convictions and that they should not be punished for the supremacy of
conscience . . .. [T]he Court in Gillette found a valid secular purpose in the
congressional desire to promote and to protect the sort of conscientious action thought
to be important in a democratic society. We believe that similar considerations were
implicit in the reasonable accommodation rule, which to that extent is sustained by a
neutral legislative purpose. s 2
The court further reasoned that, since the reasonable accommodation rule
required no financial support from the government and that any benefits to
religious institutions would be merely incidental, it had a primary effect that
neither advanced nor inhibited religion. 53
a district court decision upholding the validity of the reasonable accommodation rule under the
establishment clause, see Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
46. 516 F.2d at 554. See Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo.
1974).
47. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
48. Id. at 773 (citations omitted).
49. 516 F.2d at 552.
50. Id.
51. 401 U.S. 437 (197 1). Gillette concerned the validity of a draft exemption for conscientious
objectors to war in any form. Petitioners objected only to "unjust" wars, namely Vietnam, and
challenged the draft exemption on grounds that the "special statutory status accorded con-
scientious objection to all war, but not objection to a particular war, work[ed] a de facto
discrimination among religions." Id. at 451-52. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's
claim, finding that considerations of fairness and the difficulty of applying an exemption for those
who opposed only unjust wars justified the Congressional exemption. Id. at 454-60; see Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
52. 516 F.2d at 552-53. In his dissent, Judge Celebrezze contended that none of these reasons
justified a finding of a valid secular purpose. He argued that both regulation 1605 and section
2000e(j) "[define] religion so as to require that persons receive preferential treatment because of
their religion." Id. at 556 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 553, citing Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771-72 (1973).
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Finally, in considering the fear of excessive entanglement, the court found
that regulation 1605 and section 2000e(j) would require "little or no contact
between religious institutions and governmental erntities."154 While the dissent
argued that the accommodation rule would force courts into scrutinizing the
sincerity and validity of religious beliefs,55 the majority felt that such consid-
erations would not be "disputed seriously" and even if they were, it would
require no more entanglement than is used to determine if a "purported
church qualifies for a property tax exemption." 56
The court's establishment clause analysis left many questions unanswered.
The majority's reliance on Gillette, 57 in upholding the valid, secular purpose
of the rule, may be somewhat misplaced. One year before the decision in
Gillette, the Supreme Court was faced with the problem of construing the
same conscientious objector exemption in Welsh v. United States.58 In
upholding its constitutionality, the Court, in the words of Justice Harlan,
"completely transformed the statute by reading out of it any distinction
between religiously acquired beliefs and those deriving from 'essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code.' -9
What followed in the Gillette case was an attempt by petitioners to extend
this exemption, which had already been stripped of its formal "religion"
requirement, to those who opposed only particular, unjust wars. In this
context, it appears that the Cummins court's analogy between the draft
exemption and the reasonable accommodation rule lost some of its sig-
nificance. 60
The issue of excessive entanglement was properly raised by the dissent in
Cummiins, for in numerous cases which have dealt with the reasonable
accommodation rule, the sincerity of the petitioner's beliefs has been noted by
the courts.6 1 Thus, unless the scope of the religious exemption in the
Judge Celebrezze urged that the rule discriminated not only "between religion and nonreligion"
but also "among religions." Id. at 558 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 553.
55. Id. at 559 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 554.
57. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
58. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). The draft exemption involved stated in pertinent part: -Nothing
contained in this title . . . shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant
training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. As used in this
subsection, the term 'religious training and belief' does not include essentially political, sociologi.
cal, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code." 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1970). See
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
59. 398 U.S. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
60. In his dissent, Judge Celebrezze seems to suggest this, stating- "Unlike the exemption
from the draft laws for those conscientiously opposed to all war upheld in Gillette, the preference
here is extended on the explicit basis of 'religious practices' under the Regulation and 'all aspects
of religious observance and practice, as well as belief' under the 1972 amendment." 516 F.2d at
559 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
61. See, e.g., Young v. Southwestern Say. &.Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 14Z n.3 (5th Cir.
1975) ("[tlhere is no question of the sincerity of Mrs. Young's religious beliefs"); Reid v. Memphis
19751
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reasonable accommodation rule is more clearly defined, courts may well be
forced into a case by case examination of the worth of petitioner's personal
motivation. Such an approach is precisely that which Justice Harlan warned
against in Walz v. Tax Commission:62
Obviously the more discriminating and complicated the basis of classification for an
exemption-even a neutral one-the greater the potential for state involvement in
evaluating the character of the organizations. 63
Publ. Co., 468 F.2d 346,348(6th Cir. 1972), remanded, 369 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, No. 74-1761 (6th Cir., Aug. 20, 1975) 'It]here is nothing in the proof to indicate
that plaintiffs refusal to work on Saturday was anything other than a conscientious and previously
formed religious conviction"); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1114 (5th Cir. 1972) ("[t]here Is
no dispute as to the sincerity with which he held to the tenets of his church. . .); Kettell v. Johnson &
Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892, 895 (E.D. Ark. 1972) ("[tihe Courtfinds that Mr. Kettel was a competent,
hard-working employee and that he was sincere in his beliefs and would not in fact compromise those
beliefs by working on Saturdays'); Dawson v. Mizell, 325 F. Supp. 511, 513 (E.D. Va. 1971) ("[tlhere
is no doubtof the plaintiff s conscientious and sincere belief in the teachings of his church"); Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709, 711 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd, 429 F.2d 324 (the Cir. 1970),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) ("[tlhere is no dispute that these religious
beliefs of plaintiff aresincere'); Jackson v. Veri Fresh Poultry, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1276, 1278 (E.D.
La. 1969) ("I am convinced also that plaintiff is sincere in her religious beliefs').
62. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
63. Id. at 698-99 (opinion of Harlan, J.). The most obvious problem that the Sixth Circuit did
not resolve is the effect of the free exercise clause on the reasonable accommodation rule--
specifically, the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
In Sherbert, the Court found that by denying a Seventh Day Adventist unemployment com-
pensation due to her refusal to accept any job which demanded Saturday work, South Carolina
had unconstitutionally interfered with the free exercise of religion. In its decision in Dewey, the
Sixth Circuit dismissed Sherbert because it "involved state, and not private action," 429 F.2d at
329, and has since not commented on Sherbert's applicability. See Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 3,
at 630.
By omitting any discussion of the free exercise clause, the Sixth Circuit contributes to the
uncertainty surrounding the relationship between the two clauses of the first amendment. The
Supreme Court itself has stated: "The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the
two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded
to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely straight line .
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1969); see L. Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom
138-39 (rev. ed. 1967).
In light of this conflict it is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court may analyze the
constitutionality of the reasonable accommodation rule. This depends in large part upon whether
the Court will approach the problem with a strict establishment clause analysis (note 45 supra); a
Sunday closing law analysis (see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 554 (6th Cir. 1975),
petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) (No. 478)); or an extended free exercise
analysis (see West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law 279-83
(1972)). These three approaches do overlap, but the different decisions which they have prompted are
somewhat bewildering. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1969); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 247, 296-99 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); L. Barker & T.
Barker, Civil Liberties and the Constitution 41-44 (2d ed. 1975).
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Although the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cummins raised new questions,
several things were clearly established by the court. They indicated that not only
was there "no difference between the Regulation and the amendment," but also
that both were valid and constitutional. 6 4 The court required employers to meet
exacting standards to satisfy the requirements of the reasonable accommodation
rule, but indicated that the burden of proving "undue hardship" was heavy.
Three months later, the Sixth Circuit heard a second appeal of Reid v.
Memphis Publishing Co. (Reid II),65 which arose from a denial of plaintiff
Reid's motion for attorney's fees. The defendant cross-appealed from the
judgment of the district court on remand entered against it in favor of Reid. 66
The district court had previously found that the defendant had not made a
reasonable accommodation to Reid's religious needs, for the company had
simply refused to hire him. 67 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of attorney's
fees but reversed the judgment in favor of Reid and remanded the case for
dismissal of the complaint. 68 The court found that regulation 1605. 1 and section
2000e(j) did not "establish a Congressional intent with respect to the 1964
statute. '69 In discussing the "religion" provisions of Title VII as they appeared
prior to the 1972 addition of section 2000ea)-the codification of the reasonable
accommodation rule-the court found that "[t]hese two statutes are plain and
unambiguous. They are aimed solely at discrimination. "7 0 From this premise,
the court concluded that regulation 1605.1 had added "something new and
entirely different from discrimination,"7 1 and therefore the mandates of the
guideline were ignored.
The Sixth Circuit's decisions in Cummins andReid II are difficult to reconcile.
The validity and constitutionality of regulation 1605.1 and section 2000e(j) are
rendered uncertain byReid II. That decision also suggests that the Sixth Circuit
has abandoned the EEOC discrimination by effect standard, returning to the
discrimination by intent standard outlined in Dewey. 72 The majority in Reid II
completely ignored the result in Cummins, in spite of the fact that one judge was
on the panel of both cases.7 3 Cummins was cited in the dissent in Reid II, which
pointed out that not only had the validity of the reasonable accommodation rule
64. 516 F.2d at 547. Cummins was recently followed in Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp.,
397 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
65. Reid v. Memphis Publ. Co., No. 74-1761 (6th Cir., Aug. 20, 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Reid II Slip Opinion].
66. Id. at 1; see note 31 supra.
67. Reid U1 Slip Opinion at 9-10; see note 31 supra.
68. Reid II Slip Opinion at 17.
69. Id. at 16.
70. Id. at 12.
71. Id. at 14.
72. See text accompanying notes 18-23, 30-31, 44-45 supra.
73. Edwards, J. and Celebrezze, J. represented the majority in Reid I (468 F.2d 346 (6th Cir.
1972)). Phillips, C. J. and McCree, J. constituted the majority in Cummins (516 F.2d 544 (6th
Cir. 1975)), while Judge Celebrezze dissented. Weick, J. and Celebrezze, J. comprised the
majority in Reid 11 (No. 74-1761 (6th Cir., Aug. 20, 1975)), while Judge Edwards wrote the
dissenting opinion.
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been upheld in Reid I and Cummins, but also that there had been no motion for a
rehearing en banc for Reid 11. 14
In light of the new facts brought to the court's attention on appeal in Reid 11, 75
the court could have found simply that the newspaper could not possibly
accommodate Reid's needs without undue hardship, and thus the reasonable
accommodation rule and the Cummins decision would have remained unques-
tioned. The status of the reasonable accommodation rule in the Sixth Circuit is
unclear. The spectre of uncertainty will remain until final resolution by an en
banc rehearing or by the Supreme Court.
Susan Buckley
Securities-Rule lOb-5-Supreme Court Reaffirms Birnbaum Doc-
trine.-Defendant, New Blue Chip Stamp, under the terms of an antitrust
consent decree, was required to offer a substantial number of shares of its
common stock at bargain rates to plaintiffs. In 1970, two years after the
offering, plaintiff respondents, filed a class action suit' claiming that the
prospectus filed by Blue Chip was overly pessimistic and materially mis-
leading. Plaintiffs, alleging that Blue Chip had fraudulently prepared the
prospectus in an effort to dissuade them from accepting the bargain offer, 2
sought money damages under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
19343 and rule 10b-5. 4 Defendants contended that plaintiffs lacked standing
74. Reid II Slip Opinion at 24 n. I (Edwards, J., dissenting). A case can be heard en bane
when consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions.
Fed. R. App. P. 35(a). See generally Comment, In Banc Procedures in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 401 (1974). A petition for rehearing en banc was filed in the
Cummins case on June 4, 1975 and was denied on June 18, 1975. A motion for a rehearing en banc
was suggested in the Reid case on Sept. 30, 1975.
75. It seems that before the first action was tried, plaintiff Reid had obtained other
employment at a higher salary than that offered by the defendant newspaper. Reid II Slip
Opinion at 4, 10. The court also found that in order to accommodate Reid's beliefs, the employer
may have been forced to hire yet another copyreader besides Reid. Id. at 8, 18-21.
1. Plaintiffs were retailers who had used the Blue Chip service in the past but were not
shareholders in the company.
2. The complaint alleged that Blue Chip's intent was to discourage plaintiff from buying at
the lower bargain rate, so that in the future, Blue Chip could offer the shares for a higher price to
the public.
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe .... "
4. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person . . .
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a
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to sue under rule lOb-5 because they were neither purchasers nor sellers of
securities. The district court dismissed the action. s On appeal the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. 6 The
circuit court, in concert with developing case law, found that the rule lOb-5
remedy was not limited to persons owning contractual rights to buy or sell but
embraced antitrust consent decrees which serve the same function as a
contract to buy or sell. 7 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a private
damages action under rule lob-5 was limited to actual purchasers and sellers
of securities, and that the antitrust consent decree did not give plaintiff this
status. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
Since Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. 8 found an implied civil remedy
under rule 10b-5, courts have struggled with the definition of purchaser and
seller. 9 The standard that has ostensibly been utilized by the courts'0 origi-
nated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. II In that case, the Second Circuit
looked to the administrative history of the rule and concluded that it was
intended to reach only the types of fraud normally associated with actual
purchases or sales of securities. 12 Consequently, the court refused to grant
material fact or to omit to state a material factnecessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
5. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35, 40 (C.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd, 492
F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
6. 492 F.2d 136, 142 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
7. Id.
8. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Kardon court relied primarily on the principle of tort
law which provides that violations of a legislative enactment will give rise to civil liability when
the purpose of the statute is to protect the particular interest of the person harmed. Id. at 513; see
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965). The Supreme Court has recognized this implied right
in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (197 1). However, there
has been some comment that Congress did not intend section 10(b) to apply to private causes of
action. See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-S: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent? 57
Nw. U.L. Rev. 627 (1963).
9. See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266-67 (1st Cir. 1966) (reasonableness of
reliance); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965)
(materiality); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 290 F. Supp. 934, 938 (N.D. Ohio 1968), rev'd, 417 F.2d 433
(6th Cir. 1969) (causation).
10. See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515,521-22 (8th Cir. 1973); Rekant v.
Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970); Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision
Where Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-S Is Involved, 20 Buff. L. Rev. 93 (1970); Lowenfeis,
The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-S, 54 Va. L. Rev. 268 (1968);
Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 Ala. L. Rev. 543 (1971); Comment, The
Birnbaum Doctrine-An Aging Rule Reexamined by the Courts, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 715 (1971).
11. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
12. Id. at 463. Although there was conflicting evidence as to the actual intent behind the
promulgation of rule 10b-5, the Birnbaum court relied on the SEC's enunciated purpose. -[The
new rule closes] a loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission...
if they engage in fraud in their purchase.' " Id., quoting SEC Securities Act Release No. 3230
(May 21, 1942). See generally 1 A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud SEC Rule 10b-S § 2.2, at
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standing to non-selling minority shareholders who had alleged that the former
controlling shareholders fraudulently misrepresented the circumstances of an
attractive merger offer which resulted in the diminished value of plaintiff's
stock. 13
Although courts have approached the 10b-5 standing problem with al-
ternative theories, 14 the Birnbaum purchaser-seller doctrine has remained a
persistent limitation on actions brought under rule 10b-5. 15 However, several
modifications to the limitation have developed over the years. This is due in
part to the SEC's definition of a purchaser and seller, 16 and in part to an
effort by the courts to grant judicial relief to injured parties who are not
actual purchasers or sellers. 17 The Birnbaum doctrine has been expanded to
include individuals who have not actually sold their securities, but, because of
defendant's fraudulent activities, will be compelled or forced to sell in the
near future.' 8 A forced purchaser status has been created to include
22.7 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bromberg]; Comment, The Birnbaum Doctrine-An Aging Rule
Reexamined by the Courts, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 715 (197 1). It is interesting to note that the SEC Is
now opposed to the strict purchaser-seller limitation, in favor of a more liberal application of the
10b-5 remedy. The Commission has argued this change continuously to the courts through its amlcus
curiae briefs. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 7 (1971); Mount
Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir. 1972).
13. 193 F.2d at 464. The court of appeals dismissed the action on an alternative theory,
ruling that rule lob-5 did not appy to "fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs." Id. Tills
second part of the decision has been called the "substantive ruling." But since Birnbaum, this
substantive ruling has been largely chipped away. See Folk, Corporation Law Developments-
1969, 56 Va. L. Rev. 755, 812-14 (1970); Comment, SEC Rule lOb-5-"In Connection with the
Purchase or Sale of Any Security" Restriction: Need for Analytical Precision, 5 Colum. J.L. &
Soc. Prob., Aug. 1969, at 28.
14. See note 9 supra.
15. See Delancey, Rule 10b-5--A Recent Profile, 25 BuA. Law. 1355, 1369-70 (1970). The
Ninth Circuit has observed that: "[E]very other Court of Appeals that has considered this issue
has adopted the 'purchaser-seller' requirement." Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d
339, 342 (9th Cir. 1972).
16. The Security and Exchange Act itself recognizes that a contract to purchase or sell is
tantamount to an actual purchase or sale. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (13), (14) (1970). This has been
universally accepted by the courts. See, e.g., Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339,
345 (9th Cir. 1972).
17. See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 522 (8th Cir. 1973); Mount
Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 341-42 (9th Cir. 1972); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d
792, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1970).
18. The rationale for this expansion of the strict purchaser-seller limitation is that a person
can be classified as a seller when he is confronted with the limited option of either selling at a
gross economic loss or retaining securities that have become virtually worthless. See, e.g., Travis
v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 522 (8th Cir. 1973); Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin.
Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 306-07 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Coffee v. Permian
Corp., 434 F.2d 383, 385-86 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973); Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 794 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970);
Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). But
see Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 967-68 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970); Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1968).
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persons, usually brokers, who are forced to buy after the initial lOb-5
violation because of defendant's failure to pay for the securities.' 9 The courts
have also relaxed the requirement to include: minority shareholders who have
been fraudulently induced to exchange stock in a merger,20 beneficiaries of
trusts whose trustees buy or sell, 21 constructive purchasers or sellers,2 2 and
delayed purchasers23 or sellers. 24  The limitation has been completely
eliminated in claims for injunctive relief.25 Although the Birnbaum rule has
been the subject of continual modification and criticism, 26 it has generally
been accepted by the federal courts as the standing requirement for rule lOb-5
actions. 27
Many reasons have been set forth in favor of the continued acceptance of
the Birnbaum rule. Some courts have justified the limitation as a standing
requirement which is constitutionally mandated.28 Others have accepted the
rule on grounds that only Congress should change such a well established
19. See, e.g., A-T. Brod Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1967); Jefferies & Co. v.
Arkus-Duntov, 357 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
20. Shareholders who have exchanged stock as a result of a merger take on the identity of
both a purchaser of the shares he has received and seller of the shares he has exchanged. E.g.,
SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 234 (D. Neb. 1972).
21. James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973); Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F.
Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
22. Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972) (beneficiary in debenture redemption
plan); Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1971) (trustee in bankruptcy);
Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814
(1961) (issuer of security).
23. Ashton v. Thornley Realty Co., 346 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 471 F.2d 647
(2d Cir. 1973); Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
24. Silverman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 331 F. Supp. 1334 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (broker failed to
sell on time); Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 367 F.2d 157
(2d Cir. 1966) (broker failed to sell on plaintiff's request); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F.
Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (broker actively induced plaintiff not to sell). But see Hirsch v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
25. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967); Tully v. Mott
Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 841 (D.N.J. 1972); see Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161,
173 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970)..
26. See, e.g., Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue
Under Rule 10b-5 Is Involved, 20 Buff. L. Rev. 93 (1970); Lowenfels, The Demise of the
Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 Va. L. Rev. 268 (1968); Comment, The
Purchaser-Seller Rule: An Archaic Tool for Determining Standing Under Rule 10b-S, 56 Geo.
L.J. 1177 (1968); 6 Loyola U.-Chi. L.J. 230 (1975).
27. See, e.g., Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970). See also Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue under SEC Rule
10b-5, 49 Tex. L. Rev. 617, 625-27 (1971).
28. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 805 (5th Cir. 1970). This court applied the two-
pronged test used by the Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970); see note 59 infra.
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interpretation, 2 9 or that Congress did not intend to grant a federal remedy to
those who did not qualify as a purchaser or seller. 30 Still others have upheld
the Birnbaum rule on grounds that it is a necessary restriction to prevent a
flood of litigation based on unprovable allegations. 1
Notwithstanding the many exceptions which have been carved, most courts
have rejected any opportunity to repudiate Birnbaum.3 2 The most serious
challenge to the rule was raised by the Seventh Circuit in Eason v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp.33 In Eason, plaintiffs, who were shareholders in a
corporation which purchased a car leasing company, personally guaranteed
certain notes assumed by the buyer corporation. When the leasing business
failed and the corporation defaulted on the notes, plaintiffs brought an action
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, alleging that the value of the leasing
company's assets had been misrepresented, and seeking rescission of their
guarantees. The district court dismissed the complaint on the basis of
Birnbaum. The Seventh Circuit reversed and found that, although plaintiffs
were not buyers or sellers of securities, they could have obtained relief under
rule 10b-5 if, in their capacity as investors, they had been injured as a direct
result of fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 34 In
reaching its decision, the Eason court concentrated on three issues: standing,
the class of persons intended to be protected by rule 10b-5, and the policy
considerations in favor of retention of the Birnbaum rule. 35
The court first distinguished the Birnbaum standing requirement from that
of standing in the constitutional sense, which requires only a sufficient interest
in an actual case or controversy. The court then rejected the Birnbaum
standing requirement in favor of a more liberal interpretation of rule lob-5. 36
29. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156-57 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974);
Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1972).
30. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 146-47 (9th Cir. 1973) (dissenting
opinion).
31. See, e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970); Bound Brook Water Co.
v. Jaffe, 284 F. Supp. 702, 708 (D.N.J. 1968); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Rule: An Archaic
Tool for Determining Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 56 Geo. L.J. 1177, 1178-79 (1968). See also
Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450 (1970).
32. See James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944, 947 (6th Cir. 1973); Travis v. Anthes
Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 521 n.9 (8th Cir. 1973); Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464
F.2d 339, 341-44 (9th Cir. 1972). But see Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d
654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. .960 (1974); Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp.
490 (D. Utah 1973); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972).
33. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
34. Id. at 659-60; see Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 842 (D.N.J. 1972).
35. 490 F.2d at 656.
36. The Eason court regarded the Birnbaum standing limitation as something more than that
required by article III of the Constitution. Id. at 657-58. the court went on to apply, in effect,
the Supreme Court's two pronged test for standing announced in Association of Data Processing
Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970). Although the Eason decision did not
specifically mention this test, it has been suggested that in fact the court did consider both aspects
of the test. See Note, Standing To Sue In 10b-5 Actions: Eason v. GMAC And Its Impact On
The Bimbaum Doctrine, 49 Notre Dame Law. 1131, 1141-42 (1974); 42 Fordham L. Rev. 688,
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The court concluded that plaintiffs satisfied the lob-5 standing requirement
since they belonged to that class for whose benefit rule 10b-5 was created,
i.e., "persons who, in their capacity as investors, suffer significant injury as a
direct consequence of fraud in connection with a securities transaction, even
though their participation in the transaction did not involve either the
purchase or the sale of a security. ' 37 The court based its conclusion primarily
on the general erosion of the Birnbaum rule which had the effect of extending
"protection to a variety of persons not included within the traditional defini-
tion of either a purchaser or seller."38 Finally, the court dismissed the policy
considerations in favor of the Birnbaum rule, 39 and found that any possible
increase in federal litigation should not stand in the way of "what we believe
to be a correct interpretation of the statute .... ,,40
In Blue Chip, the Supreme Court rejected the trend liberalizing rule l0b-5's
standing requirements. The Court pointed out that respondents "derive[d] no
entitlement from the anti-trust consent decree and [did] not otherwise possess
any contractual rights relating to the offered stock .... ,,41 Thus the Court
found that the status of the respondent was not unlike any other "disap-
pointed offeree of a stock . . . who claims that an overly pessimistic
prospectus. .. has caused it to allow its opportunity to purchase to pass.14 2
The Court noted that although respondents were encompassed in the antitrust
consent decree and therefore may have been part of a smaller class of
potential plaintiffs, they were still "neither 'purchasers' nor 'sellers' as those
terms are defined in the 1934 Act"' 43 and therefore they did not have standing
to sue under a rule 10b-5 claim."4
694 (1974). For a discussion of the difference between the constitutional standing requirement and
the Birnbaum standing requirement, see note 59 infra.
37. 490 F.2d at 659.
38. Id. at 658. The Eason court also based it's decision on the Supreme Court's finding that
section 10(b) should be read flexibly. Id. at 659; see, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971). Reliance upon Bankers Life in support of a rejection of Birnbaum has been criticized by
both courts and commentators. See, e.g., Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell. 464 F.2d 339,
344 (9th Cir. 1972); Ryan, Bankers Life: Birnbaum Reconsidered, 4 Loyola U.-Chi. L.J. 47,
58-59 (1973).
39. Policy considerations included the fear of a flood of federal litigation and a desire to
preserve consistency in the interpretation of federal securities legislation. 490 F.2d at 660-61.
40. Id. at 660. The Eason decision was not accepted by the other circuits with Birnbaum
being recently reaffirmed in Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 765 (5th Cir. 1974); Land)' v.
FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156-57 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). However, Eason waf
adopted bythe Seventh Circuit. C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc., v. G & G Enterprises, SS F.2d 1354, 1358
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) (No. 74-1283).
41. 95 S. CL 1917, 1933 (1975); see, e.g., Dahl, Inc. v. Roy Cooper Co., 448 F.2d 17 (9th Cir.
1971).
42. 95 S. CL at 1933.
43. Id. at 1934. The court was not impressed with the fact that plaintiffs were members of a
limited class of persons who were offered Blue Chip stock under the consent decree. This limited
offering did not transform plaintiffs into actual purchasers or sellers.
44. Id. at 1934-35.
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The Court based its decision to reaffirm the Birnbaum rule on three major
considerations. 45 First, it recognized that virtually all lower federal courts
facing this same issue in the hundreds of reported cases have reaffirmed
Birnbaum's conclusion. 4 6 Moreover, the Court pointed out that Congress had
the opportunity to change the wording of section 10(b) to include " 'any
attempt to purchase or sell, any security' " but that the legislature had refused
to reject Birnbaum's analysis of the wording of section 10(b). 47
The Court's second justification for its reaffirmation of the strict purchaser-
seller requirement was based on "considerations of policy."' 48 The Court
reasoned that a loose standing requirement could result in a "widely expanded
class of plaintiffs," which in turn would open the floodgates for vexatious
litigation. 49 Moreover, the Court feared that a rejection of the Birnbaum rule
"would throw open to the trier of fact many rather hazy issues of historical
fact the proof of which depended almost entirely on oral testimony. "30 In such
a case, rule 10b-5 could permit substantial recoveries based solely upon the
allegation that the plaintiff was damaged due to the fraudulent misrep-
resentations of the defendant~s I Concomitant with this fear was the possibility
that a claim may be brought to court, the settlement value of which is totally
out of proportion to the plaintiff's prospects of success at trial. 52 Since, in the
securities field, the mere pendency of a lawsuit can be very costly to a
corporation, many defendants might choose settlement, even though the claim
45. Id. at 1923-27.
46. Id. at 1923; see note 15 supra. As the first court to reject Birnbaum totally, the Eason
court relied on several decisions as repudiations of the rule. 490 F.2d at 658. However, these
decisions were in no way a rejection, but rather an attempt to follow the Supreme Court's
direction to apply section 10(b) flexibly. James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944, 950 (6th Cir.
1973); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977
(1967).
47. 95 S. Ct. at 1924 (emphasis original).
48. Id. at 1932.
49. Id. at 1927; see, e.g., Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 146-47 (9th
Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion); note 31 supra and accompanying text, But see Scott, Standing
in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 645, 673 (1973).
50. 95 S. Ct. at 1929. The court recognized that the elimination of the purchaser-seller
limitation would permit, in 10b-5 litigation, a new class of plaintiffs whose damages would be
extremely difficult to ascertain. In cases where plaintiff neither bought nor sold securities there
would be the questions of whether he suffered any harm at all due to defendant's fraudulent
activities and what the extent of this harm would be. See, e.g., Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip
Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 141 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical
Precision Where Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5 Is Involved, 20 Buff. L. Rev. 93, 96-97
(1970).
51. 95 S. Ct. at 1929.
52. Id. at 1927. The risk of a rule 10b-5 suit can be ominous in that the defendant may be
subjected to substantial costs. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). Because the stakes are so high, very few cases reach
the merits of the claim. If a plaintiff survives a dismissal motion, the corporate defendant will
generally seek a settlement rather than risk a battle in court. See I Bromberg, supra note 12,
§ 1.3(2); 3 Bromberg, supra note 12, § 9.1.
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is unfounded. In addition, the Court was concerned that abuse of the liberal
discovery devices by plaintiffs would frustrate and burden the defendant
company, thus making it more amenable to settlement S3
The third and arguably the most important reason for the Court's decision
was a reliance on the "intention of Congress" in passing section 10(b).54 The
majority opinion emphasized that when Congress passed the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, it was not reluctant to use the word "offer" in other
sections of the Act when it wished to "provide a remedy to those who neither
purchase nor sell securities ... ."55 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that
the underlying rationale behind the implication of a civil remedy stemming
from section 10(b) and rule lob-5 was due in part to the fact that section 29(b)
of the Act of 1934 granted a civil remedy to any person who had made a
contract in violation of any provision of the Act. 56 The Court reasoned that if
the justification of an implied civil right is based on the assumption that there
is a contract or sale between the parties, then without the contract or sale,
there is doubt that any civil claim can be implied.57
In discussing the Birnbaum rule as a standing limitation on rule 10b-5
actions, the Court emphasized that it was not dealing "with any private right
created by the express language of § 10b or of Rule 10b-5.... [but] with a private
cause of action which had been judicially [created]... and which [would] have to
be judicially delimited.., unless and until Congress addresses the question.""8
The Court's strong emphasis on the intent of Congress points to the conclusion
that in cases where the plaintiff seeks to bring a private action for damages on the
basis of a violation of a statute, he must bring himself within the class of persons
intended to be benefited by the statute. 59 Further evidence of the Court's heavy
reliance on the intent of Congress is seen in the majority's recognition that
53. 95 S. Ct. at 1927-28; see, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). But cf. 95 S. CL at 1941 (dissenting opinion).
54. 95 S. CL at 1933. It is interesting to note that in Birnbaum the court viewed the purpose
of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 from the perspective of administrative intent, while in Ma.nor
Drugs the Supreme Court based its decision to reaffirm Birnbaum on the legislative intenL See
note 12 supra.
55. 95 S. Ct. at 1925. The concurring opinion pointed out that the starting point in every
case involving the construction of a statute is the language of the statute itself. There is no
evidence within the statute which would hint that section 10(b) was intended to include offers to
sell or purchase. Id. at 1935.
56. Id. at 1925.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1931-32.
59. A recent series of Supreme Court cases have considered the standing issue. These
decisions generally have involved citizen challenges to administrative actions. United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (suit by
students challenging increased freight rates by ICC as having adverse environmental impact);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (suit by private dub challenging action by U.S. forest
service); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (suit by farmer challenging regulations promul-
gated by the Secretary of Agriculture); Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970) (suit by private corporation challenging action by the Comptroller of the
Currency); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer suit challenging the validity of HEW
1975]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
although the strict purchaser-seller limitation is an "arbitrary restriction which
unreasonably prevents some deserving plaintiffs from recovering damages
which have in fact been caused by violations of Rule lob-S, '60 the plaintiff must
be within the class of persons which Congress intended to protect through the
statute .
6 1
The three justice concurring opinion strongly emphasized the wording of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts, especially the language of section 10(b) and rule
10b-5. 6 2 The concurring opinion noted that "[n]othing in the history of the
Securities Acts supports any congressional intent to include mere offers in
§ 10(b). '" 63 Thus it appears that the common denominator among the six
justice majority is the importance they attribute to the intent of Congress to
limit the section 10(b) remedy to actual purchasers and sellers of securities.
A major concern raised by the Court's decision is what consequences Blue
Chip will have on those exceptions carved from Birnbaum. 64 Arguably, the
Court has now put an end to the "case-by-case erosion" of the Birnbaum
rule.
65
Were we to agree with the Court of Appeals in this case, we would leave the Birnbaum
rule open to endless case-by-case erosion depending on whether a particular group of
plaintiffs were thought by the court in which the issue was being litigated to be
sufficiently more discrete than the world of potential purchasers at large to justify an
exception.66
expenditures). As a result of these decisions a two-pronged test has evolved to determine standing
in the federal courts. First, the Constitution requires an actual case or controversy. In order to
satisfy this minimum standard, a plaintiff must have a " 'personal stake in the outcome of tie
controversy.' "392 U.S. at 101. Furthermore, in actions challenging administrative acts, the Court
has imposed a second standard whereby the plaintiff must show that the interest he seeks to
protect "is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ......
Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). For a critical
discussion of this two-pronged standard see Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 450 (1970). The purpose of this second requirement is to insure that in an action challenging an
administrative act, the plaintiff will be a party who is significantly involved and will be "a reliable
private attorney general." 397 U.S. at 154.
However, when a plaintiff seeks standing on the basis of a violation of a statute, his primary
purpose is to protect his own interests and not to be a private attorney general. Thus the Camp
test would be inapplicable in a claim alleging a violation of section 10(b). The standing
requirement which has developed under section 10(b) calls for the plaintiff to bring himself within
the class of persons whose interests the statute was designed to protect. Herpich v. Wallace, 430
F.2d 792, 805-06 (5th Cir. 1970); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); see Restatement of Torts § 286 (b) (1934); 1 Bromberg, supra note
12, § 2.4 (1), (2).
60. 95 S. Ct. at 1926.
61. Id. at 1923. The courts should not substitute their judgment concerning who should be
protected from securities fraud for that of Congress as this would be usurping the legislative
function. See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 413 (1962).
62. 95 S. Ct. at 1935.
63. Id.
64. Brodsky, The 'Birnbaum' Rule, 174 N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
65. See Thomas v. Roblin Indus., Inc., [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,259, at
98,338 (3d Cir. July 31, 1975).
66. 95 S. Ct. at 1934.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The emphasis on congressional intent and on whether the plaintiffs are
members of the class intended to be benefited also arguably supports the
conclusion that the Court will not recognize the exceptions to Birnhaum.6"
While the underlying theme in the Blue Chip decision seems to mandate a
very strict application of the purchaser-seller requirement, a closer inspection
of the majority opinion reflects the desire of the Court to leave room for some
of the exceptions. In addition to finding that the rule "unreasonably prevents
some deserving plaintiffs from recovering damages," 68 the majority also
pointed out that, absent countervailing advantages, the rule "would be
undesirable as a matter of policy, however much it might be supported by
precedent and legislative history."69 The countervailing advantages of a strict
rule are what the court found to be "policy considerations. '70 Thus where the
policy considerations are absent, as, for example, where a plaintiff does not
pose a threat of vexatious litigation, it would seem that Blue Chip would not
preclude standing-as long as the claimant has the status of a purchaser or
seller in the broad construction. 7 1
Consequently, whether one of the exceptions to Birnbaum will survive the
Blue Chips decision depends on whether it violates policy considerations. In
the forced seller exception, for example, the non-selling plaintiff assumes the
status of a seller, since, because of the fraud of the other party, he is forced to
sell at a financial loss or to retain a virtually worthless security. 72 This
expansion of the purchaser-seller doctrine generally does not create the prob-
lems of vexatious litigation which the Blue Chip Court feared, since the
plaintiff in this situation is in effect forced to sell a definite number of
securities. The only problem which may arise is determining whether the
plaintiff will be forced to sell, i.e., the extent to which his options have been
limited due to the defendant's fraud. If his options have been totally elimi-
67. Brodsky, The'Birnbaum' Rule, 174 N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1975, at 2, col. 3. The viability of the
exceptions to Birnbaum has now been cast in doubt by the Court's heavy reliance on congres-
sional intent. If the Blue Chip decision is viewed as requiring plaintiffs to be actual or statutory
purchasers or sellers of securities, any modification of the Birnbaum rule will now be unac-
ceptable. For example, the forced seller exception would now become ineffective as that
modification allowed a seller standing even though he had not actually parted with his shares.
See note 18 supra. On the other hand, certain exceptions would remain. For example, in a merger
situation, a shareholder of a target corporation who exchanges stock pursuant to a merger has
consistently been afforded standing. See note 20 supra. This exception would still be in effect
because the Securities Exchange Act defines purchase as to "otherwise acquire" and sale as to
"otherwise dispose" of shares. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a) (13), (14), 1S U.S.C.
§ 78c(a) (13), (14) (1970).
68. 95 S. Ct. at 1926.
69. Id. at 1927. In addition, the majority pointed out that the evidence to support the
congressional intent was not conclusive. Id. at 1924.
70. Id. at 1927; see notes 18-25 supra and accompanying text.
71. Brodsky, The'Bimbaum' Rule, 174 N.Y. L.J.,July 2, 1975, at 1, col. 1. Furtherevidence of
the Court's intentto allow non-vexatious claims is its indication that injunction cases would continue
to be an exception to the Bimbaum rule. Id. at 3, col. 3; see 95 S. CL at 1933 n. 14. In an injunction
action, the plaintiff seeks judicial relief before he has boughtor sold, and therefore, unlike a claimant
seeking damages, he cannot tailor his evidence after the alleged fraud.
72. See note 18 supra.
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nated then there should be no reason to deny him standing. However, if they
have been limited only slightly, the plaintiff has not been forced to sell and
therefore should be denied standing under the forced seller exception.
Another exception to the Birnbaum rule is the aborted seller of securities. 73
An aborted seller contends that he would have sold his securities but for the
fraud of the defendant.74 Here the policy problems are obvious: the plaintiff's
evidence is based solely on uncorroborated testimony of what he would have
done, and there is no actual proof of how much he would have sold. Thus the
courts would open to any person who can claim that "he would have sold but
for. .. ." This speculativeness is exactly what the Court feared in Blue Chip.
It would seem that to protect against this type of suit there must be some
minimum standard.
A broad reading of Blue Chip would demonstrate that to satisfy the
minimum requirement for standing, a plaintiff must be either an actual,
statutory purchaser or seller, or one who has assumed the role of purchaser or
seller 5 where there is not a realistic fear of vexatious litigation. This liberal
construction of Blue Chip would allow the lower federal courts some leeway
to find new solutions in an effort to grant a federal remedy to plaintiffs who
have not actually purchased or sold securities, but who have been injured by
the alleged fraud. Unless or until Congress decides to expand the purchaser-
seller limitation, federal courts seeking to fashion remedies for injured
plaintiffs who are not purchasers or sellers may very well begin carving
exceptions to Blue Chip, "a la Birnbaum.
Frederick C. Kentz III
73. Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 92,591 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Blue Chip is an example of an aborted purchaser of securities.
74. See Note, 10b-5 Standing Under Birnbaum: The Case of the Missing Remedy, 24
Hastings L.J. 1007, 1016 (1973).
75. See notes 18-25 supra and accompanying text.
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